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The Labor and Employment Law
Decisions of the Supreme Court's
2003-04 Term
Stephen F. Befort*
1. Introduction
It is longstanding tradition for the Secretary of the ABA's Labor
and Employment Law Section to prepare a summary of the labor and
employment decisions issued during each Supreme Court term. The
paper is presented at the Section's annual meeting and then published
in THE LABOR LAWYER. In preparing for this task, I reviewed each of
the articles published by the various Section secretaries over the past
decade.' I was struck by the consistent good work and thoughtful anal-
ysis of these articles. I have big shoes to fill.
Not surprisingly, many of the authors attempted to identify an
overarching theme from that year's set of decisions. Sometimes, the
theme reflected the number of cases decided in a particular subject
matter area, such as "the year of the sexual harassment trilogy" as
identified by Marley Weiss in the 1997-98 term.2 At other times, the
theme emerged from a recurring procedural pattern.3 In some years, of
*Mr. Befort is Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty, & Bennett Professor of Law, University of
Minnesota Law School. During 2003-04, Professor Befort served as secretary of the La-
bor and Employment Law Section of the American Bar Association. The author thanks
David Bryce for research assistance, Christopher J. Kopka for ERISA assistance, and
Anne T. Johnson for editorial assistance.
1. Maria O'Brien Hylton, The Supreme Court's Labor and Employment Decisions:
2002-2003 Term, 19 LAB. LAW. 247 (2003); Cynthia Estlund, The Supreme Court's Labor
and Employment Cases of the 2001-2002 Term, 18 LAB. LAW. 291 (2002); Henry H. Perritt
Jr., Analysis of U.S. Supreme Court Employment Law Decisions, 17 LAB. LAW. 367 (2001);
James J. Brudney, The Changing Complexion of Workplace Law: Labor and Employment
Decisions of the Supreme Court's 1999-2000 Term, 16 LAB. LAW. 151 (2000); Harry F.
Tepker Jr., Writing on the Law of Work on Nero's Pillars: The 1998-99 Term of the U.S.
Supreme Court, 15 LAB. LAW. 181 (1999); Marley S. Weiss, The Supreme Court 1997-
1998 Labor and Employment Law Term (Part II): The NLRA, Takings Clause, and ADA
Cases, 14 LAB. LAW. 533 (1999); Marley S. Weiss, The Supreme Court 1997-1998 Labor
and Employment Law Term (Part I): The Sexual Harassment Decisions, 14 LAB. LAW.
261 (1998); Keith N. Hylton, Labor and the Supreme Court: Review of the 1996-1997
Term, 13 LAB. LAW. 263 (1997); Michael H. Gottesman, Labor, Employment and Benefit
Decisions of the Supreme Court's 1995-96 Term, 12 LAB. LAW. 325 (1997); Joseph R.
Grodin, Report on the 1993-1994 Supreme Court Labor and Employment Law Term, 10
LAB. LAW. 693 (1994).
2. Weiss, supra note 1, at 261.
3. See, e.g., Gottesman, supra note 1, at 326 (noting the Court's prevalence in that
term to defer to administrative agencies, particularly the National Labor Relations
Board).
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course, the author's conclusion was that the smattering of decisions
offered no theme whatsoever.4
The Supreme Court, during the 2003-04 term, decided seven labor
and employment decisions. In three of these decisions, the Court con-
strued provisions of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA).5 The other four cases each raised issues under a different
federal statute, namely the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA),6 Title VII,7 the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),' and
racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. section 1981. The Supreme Court
also decided two other decisions that, while not arising under a labor
or employment statute, have definite implications for labor and em-
ployment law.
Two trends emerge as possible contenders for this year's theme.
Perhaps the most obvious option is to identify the past term as "the
year of ERISA." In terms of sheer volume, the ERISA decisions domi-
nated with a whopping 43 percent of the total labor and employment
docket.9
The other nominee may be less obvious at first blush, but none-
theless is a very legitimate contender. That is, this past term also could
be remembered as "the year in which not a whole lot happened in the
realm of labor and employment law." This possible conclusion also finds
support in statistics. The seven labor and employment decisions issued
by the Supreme Court represent the second lowest number of the past
two decades.1 ° Some of this paucity is attributable to the fact that the
Court now accepts review of approximately one-half as many cases as
it did in the early 1980s. 11 But even when viewed proportionately, this
year's term is far below the norm. As former Secretary James Brudney
has chronicled, labor and employment cases made up an average of 16
percent of the Court's docket during the last twenty-five years of the
twentieth century.' 2 This year's seven decisions, in comparison, consti-
tute just 9.5 percent of the Court's seventy-four decisions.1 3
4. See, e.g., Grodin, supra note 1, at 694 (stating the term's "cases are diverse, and
meaningful generalizations are difficult").
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
9. Three of the term's seven labor and employment law decisions arose under
ERISA, which computes to 43 percent of the total number of labor and employment law
decisions. These decisions are discussed infra at notes 171-291 and accompanying text.
10. See Gottesman, supra note 1, at 327 (reporting only six workplace-related deci-
sions for the 1994-95 term).
11. See Hylton, supra note 1, at 264 (noting that the Supreme Court's caseload had
declined from roughly 150 cases per year in the early 1980s to seventy-four cases during
the 1996-97 term).
12. Brudney, supra note 1, at 152.
13. See Thomas C. Goldstein, Statistics for the Supreme Court's October Term 2003,
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Quantity, of course, is not the sole measure of significance. A case
of great importance sometimes can trump a purely mathematical yard-
stick. The Court's 1999 decision in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,14
which construed the ADA's definition of "disability," is a prime example
of such a blockbuster decision. 5
How significant are this term's decisions? I will return to this ques-
tion and our competing themes after a review of each of this term's
decisions.
II. The Supreme Court Decisions
A. Age Discrimination in Employment Act
1. Holding
In General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 6 the Supreme
Court held that the ADEA does not prevent employers from imple-
menting policies that treat older workers more favorably than younger
workers. 17
2. Context
General Dynamics maintained a policy of providing full health care
benefits to its former employees who retired with thirty or more years
of service."8 In 1997, the company entered into a collective bargaining
agreement with the United Auto Workers limiting the provision of
health care benefits to subsequent retirees who were at least fifty years
old at the time of the agreement's signing. 19
A group of General Dynamics employees (Cline) between the ages
of forty and forty-nine brought suit alleging that the new policy violated
the ADEA.2 ° Most existing precedent did not favor Cline.2 ' While the
ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any
employee aged forty or older on the basis of age,22 most courts have
interpreted this prohibition, in light of the ADEA's stated purpose of
73 U.S.L.W. 3045 (stating that the Supreme Court decided a total of seventy-four cases
after argument during the 2003-04 term).
14. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
15. See Tepker, supra note 1, at 181 (finding the 1998-99 term dominated by two
decisions: Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (ruling that the Eleventh Amendment bars
suits under the FLSA against states in federal court); and Sutton, 527 U.S. at 471 (ruling
that disability status under the ADA should be determined taking into account the impact
of mitigating measures)).
16. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 124 S. Ct. 1236 (2004).
17. Id. at 1237.
18. See Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., 296 F.3d 466, 468 (6th Cir. 2002).
19. Cline, 124 S. Ct. at 1239.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 1244 ("The Courts of Appeals and the District Courts have read the
law the same way, and prior to this case have enjoyed virtually unanimous accord in
understanding the ADEA to forbid only discrimination preferring young to old.").
22. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000).
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protecting "older workers," to be a one-way street.23 Under this ap-
proach, a policy that disadvantages older workers relative to younger
workers, such as an early retirement program that offers fewer benefits
to employees as they get older, is unlawful,2 4 but not one that works in
the opposite direction, such as an early retirement incentive that is
available to employees only after they reach age fifty-five.25
The district court followed the majority approach and dismissed
Cline's claim citing a Seventh Circuit holding that "the ADEA does not
protect . . . the younger against the older."26 Identifying Cline's claim
under the ADEA as one of "reverse age discrimination," the court noted
that relief for such a claim had never been granted under the ADEA
A divided panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.28
In interpreting section 623(a)(1) of the ADEA, which prohibits discrim-
ination against "any individual.. . because of such individual's age,"
29
the circuit court concluded that if Congress had intended the ADEA to
protect only older workers from age discrimination it would have ex-
plicitly so stated. An interpretive regulation promulgated by the
EEOC lent support to the circuit court's position.
3 1
The Supreme Court reversed in a 6-3 decision. 32 Writing for the
majority, Justice Souter acknowledged that section 623(a)(1), because its
reference to age contains no direct modifier, theoretically could be con-
strued to include claims of age discrimination against younger workers.
3 3
Justice Souter concluded, however, that "It]his more expansive possible
understanding does not ... square with the natural reading of the
whole provision prohibiting discrimination, and in fact Congress's in-
terpretive clues speak almost unanimously to an understanding of dis-
crimination as directed against workers who are older than the ones
getting treated better."
34
Justice Souter began his discussion of the ADEA's legislative his-
tory with reference to the Wirtz Report, which was undertaken in 1964
23. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Caterpillar Inc., 966 F.2d 1226, 1227 (7th Cir. 1992)(holding
that the ADEA "does not protect the younger against the older").
24. See, e.g., Karlen v. City Colleges of Chicago, 837 F.2d 314, 318 (7th Cir. 1988).
25. See, e.g., Henn v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 819 F.2d 824, 826-27 (7th Cir. 1987).
26. Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., 98 F. Supp. 2d 846, 848 (N.D. Ohio 2000)
(quoting Hamilton v. Caterpillar Inc., 966 F.2d 1226, 1227 (7th Cir. 1992)).
27. Id. at 848.
28. Cline, 296 F.3d at 466.
29. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000).
30. Cline, 296 F.3d at 472.
31. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a) (2003) (stating, "if two people apply for the same position,
and one is 42 and the other 52, the employer may not lawfully turn down either one on
the basis of age, but must make such decision on the basis of some other factor").
32. Cline, 124 S. Ct. at 1236.
33. Id. at 1240.
34. Id.
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by then Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz.35 The conclusions of the Wirtz
Report, which were largely incorporated into the ADEA's statements
of purpose and findings, 36 indicated that significant inducements ex-
isted for employers to prefer younger over older workers.37 The report
contained no indications that older employees were benefiting at the
expense of their junior counterparts.38 Testimony at the ADEA's con-
gressional hearings substantially paralleled the Wirtz Report.39 Fi-
nally, Justice Souter noted that, as the ADEA limits the protected class
to persons aged forty and above,4" had Congress been concerned with
discrimination against younger workers "it would not likely have ig-
nored everyone under forty."4 1
The Court specifically rejected three theories advanced by Cline in
support of his position. First, Cline posited a uniform reading of "age"
as it appears in the ADEA, and argued that since the meaning of "age"
is not restricted to "old age" throughout the Act, section 623(a)(1)'s pro-
hibition against discrimination based on age must apply to younger as
well as older workers.4 2 In response, the Court held that the presump-
tion that identical words have the same meaning throughout an act is
malleable, particularly where, as in the ADEA, there is great variation
in the context in which the words are used.4 3
Second, the Court rejected Respondent's reliance on a statement
by Senator Yarborough, a sponsor of the ADEA, suggesting that the
Act's provisions applied equally to younger workers. 4 The Court held
that a single outlying statement from the bill's sponsor does not coun-
terbalance overwhelming evidence that the ADEA was intended to pro-
tect only older workers.
4 5
Finally, Cline argued that the EEOC's adoption of 29 C.F.R. section
1625.2(a) supports a broad reading of the ADEA's application.4 6 Cline
35. Id. at 1240-41 (Congress charged Secretary Wirtz with studying age discrimi-
nation in the workplace).
36. Id. at 1242.
37. Id. at 1241-42 (finding that, for example, employing older workers leads to in-
creased pension costs).
38. Id. at 1241.
39. See id. at 1241-42.
40. Cline, 124 S. Ct. at 1243; 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2000).
41. Cline, 124 S. Ct. at 1243.
42. Id. at 1245-46.
43. Id. (holding that the presumption that identical words have the same meaning
"is not rigid and readily yields whenever there is such variation in the connection in
which the words are used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were em-
ployed in different parts of the act with different intent") (quoting Atlantic Cleaners &
Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932)).
44. Cline, 124 S. Ct. at 1247-48.
45. Id. The Court also noted that the lower courts have consistently read the ADEA
not to apply to younger workers and Congress has taken no action to amend the Act in
light of these decisions. Id.
46. Id. at 1248-49; see supra note 31 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a) (2003)).
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contended that 29 C.F.R. section 1625.2(a) deserved deference under
the Chevron doctrine.47 Rejecting this argument, Justice Souter held
that devices of judicial construction left no doubt as to the meaning
Congress attached to "age" in the ADEA, and thus Chevron deference
was not applicable.
4 8
A dissenting opinion authored by Justice Thomas and joined by
Justice Kennedy would find that the plain language of the ADEA pro-
hibits discrimination because of an individual's age, regardless of
whether that individual is perceived as "too old or too young."4 9 Justice
Scalia filed a separate dissent in which he argued that the Court should
defer to the EEOC's regulatory interpretation.
50
3. Significance
The Cline decision is important in two principal respects. First, the
Cline outcome results in a twofold standing requirement for ADEA
plaintiffs. As the statute mandates, only employees aged forty and over
may assert a claim of age discrimination.5 1 In addition, the Cline de-
cision adds a second requirement. An ADEA claim is actionable only if
it challenges an employment action that disadvantages older employ-
ees as compared to younger employees.
52
The ADEA, in this respect, stands in marked contrast to Title VII,
which does not impose any class membership standing requirement.
That statute, instead, protects members of all races, as well as both
women and men.53 Title VII bans discrimination because of an individ-
ual's race or gender but does not require that a person be of any par-
ticular race or gender in order to be protected.5 4
The upshot is that while reverse discrimination claims are action-
able under Title VII, they are not under the ADEA. The ADEA is simi-
lar to the ADA in this vein. Since only qualified individuals with a
disability have standing under the ADA, reverse discrimination suits
similarly are not possible under that statute.55
Why this dichotomy? Although not expressly stated by Congress
or the Supreme Court, this distinction may reflect the fact that while
47. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
48. Cline, 124 S. Ct. at 1248.
49. Id. at 1256 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 1249 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a).
52. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
53. See Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection from Disability
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of
Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 423-24 (1997).
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (barring discrimination against "a qualified individual with
a disability"); see also Stephen F. Befort & Holly Lindquist Thomas, The ADA in Turmoil:
Judicial Dissonance, the Supreme Court's Response, and the Future ofDisability Discrim-
ination Law, 78 OR. L. REV. 68-71 (1999) (contrasting the ADA's antidiscrimination
formula with that of Title VII).
Labor and Employment Law Decisions of the Supreme Court 183
race and gender seldom bear any direct relevance to job performance,
age and disability status frequently impact an individual's ability to
perform the job.56 As such, it is arguably more defensible to restrict the
range of claims available under the ADEA and ADA than it is under
Title VII.
The second important facet of Cline concerns the decision's poten-
tial impact on early retirement programs. The typical early retirement
program offers additional benefits to workers over a certain age, such
as age fifty-five or sixty, in exchange for an agreement to quit employ-
ment and to waive any claim of discrimination concerning the agree-
ment's operation. Courts generally have found these programs lawful
if the incentive is in the nature of a carrot rather than a stick.57
The Sixth Circuit's reading of the ADEA in Cline, in practical ef-
fect, would have signaled the death knell for such programs.5" Under
the Sixth Circuit's strict textual interpretation, an employer only could
offer a lawful early retirement incentive if the offer extended to all
employees aged forty and over. Any coverage less expansive would con-
stitute a per se violation of the act. But few employers would be eager
to encourage such relatively young, yet relatively experienced workers
to leave their workforce. A forty year-old empjoyee is in the prime of
that portion of the employment life cycle during which employers enjoy
the greatest margin of benefits over costs.5 9 Further, the costs of a
program offering retirement bonuses to all employees forty and older
would be very expensive.
The elimination of early retirement programs would have been a
blockbuster result. It also would have been bad policy. Early retire-
ment programs structured through voluntary incentives provide a de-
sirable safety valve for employers needing to reduce workforce size in
response to an economic downturn. These programs also, to quote
Judge Richard Posner, are a "valued perquisite of age" for older em-
ployees desiring to shrink the amount of calendar time before they
can afford to retire. 60 It is likely that the preservation of such pro-
grams was a motivating, although unexpressed, factor in the Cline
majority's purposive interpretation.
56. See, e.g., Pamela S. Krop, Age Discrimination and the Disparate Impact Doctrine,
34 STAN. L. REV. 837, 850 (1982) (stating "unlike race, there is an inherent correlation
between age and ability"); Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil
Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 40 (2000) (stating "unlike race, dis-
ability is frequently a legitimate consideration in employment decisions").
57. See, e.g., Henn, 819 F.2d at 826-29.
58. See Karlen, 837 F.2d at 318 (7th Cir. 1988) (discussing that "early retirement
programs would effectively be outlawed" if an employer could comply with the ADEA
only by offering a retirement plan to all employees aged forty and older).
59. See generally Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause
and Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8 (1993).
60. Karlen, 837 F.2d at 317.
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B. 7Ttle VII
1. Holding
In Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders,6 1 the Supreme Court held
that the affirmative defense described in Faragher v. Boca Raton62 and
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth63 is available to employers facing
sexual harassment allegations where the plaintiff alleges a construc-
tive discharge and no adverse official action precipitated the plaintiff's
resignation.
64
2. Context
Nancy Drew Suders brought suit against the Pennsylvania State
Police (PSP) alleging that pervasive sexual harassment by her super-
visors forced her to quit her job as a police communications operator.65
When Suders contacted her employer's equal employment opportunity
officer complaining of sexual harassment, the officer told Suders to file
a complaint but did not provide the necessary form or tell Suders how
to obtain one.6 6 Two days later, Suders resigned after being arrested
for allegedly stealing her own computer-skills exam papers, tests she
took as a necessary step for advancement.6 7
Suders brought suit under Title VII claiming that her supervisors
created a hostile work environment that resulted in her constructive
discharge. 68 A hostile environment claim requires proof of "harassing
behavior sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment and create an abusive working environment."69
As determined in Ellerth and Faragher, employers generally can affir-
matively defend against allegations of harassment by showing that: (1)
sufficient internal mechanisms for reporting and correcting the ha-
rassment existed and (2) the plaintiff unreasonably neglected to pursue
resolution of the alleged harassment through such internal mecha-
nisms." Employers are barred from raising this affirmative defense,
however, if the harassment is the result of supervisor conduct "culmi-
nat[ing] in a tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion,
or undesirable reassignment."7 '
61. Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342 (2004).
62. See Faragher v. Boca Raton, 525 U.S. 775 (1998).
63. See Burlingon Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (holding that an
employer is subject to vicarious liability for supervisor harassment "culminat[ing] in a
tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment").
64. Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2347.
65. Id. at 2346-48 (describing harassment alleged by Suders).
66. Id. at 2348.
67. Id. Suders removed the papers after concluding that her supervisors falsely re-
ported that she had failed the exams, when, in fact, the exams were never forwarded for
grading. Id.
68. Id. at 2348.
69. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB, v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
70. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 742 (1998); Faragher, 524U.S. at 775.
71. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808.
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The district court granted the PSP's motion for summary judg-
ment, holding that "the PSP was not vicariously liable for the conduct
of Suders' supervisors. 7 2 Relying on Ellerth and Faragher, the court
held Suders' claims untenable because she unreasonably failed to em-
ploy the PSP's internal procedures for addressing sexual harassment.73
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, ruling that a con-
structive discharge, if proved, amounts to a tangible employment action
that renders an employer strictly liable and precludes recourse to the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense.74 In arriving at this holding, the
Third Circuit reasoned that "a constructive discharge constitutes a sig-
nificant change in employment status by ending the employer-em-
ployee relationship and ... inflicts the same type of direct economic
harm.. . as tangible employment actions."
7 5
In its decision, the Supreme Court held for the first time that Title
VII includes employer liability for constructive discharge.76 In order to
establish a constructive discharge, a plaintiff alleging sexual harass-
ment must establish that the hostile working environment became so
intolerable that his or her resignation qualified as a fitting response.77
In arriving at its holding, the Court reviewed the history of the con-
structive discharge doctrine, noting its development by the National
Labor Relations Board "to address situations in which employers coerced
employees to resign, often by creating intolerable working conditions, in
retaliation for employees' engagement in collective activities."
78
The Court, however, reversed the Third Circuit and held that an
employer may assert the Ellerth /Faragher affirmative defense unless
the plaintiff quit in response to an adverse action officially changing
her employment status or situation, such as a humiliating demotion or
an extreme cut in pay.79 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Ginsburg,
writing for the Court, distinguished harassment resulting from a su-
pervisor's official tangible employment action from other types of ha-
rassing actions lacking an official act. Following agency law, a tangible
employment action provides a clear correlation between the actions of
the supervisor-agent and employer-principal, and strict liability appro-
priately flows directly to the employer."s Absent a tangible official ac-
tion, however, no obvious connection between the supervisor and em-
72. Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2349.
73. Id. (in support of this position, the district court pointed out that Suders resigned
only two days after notifying the PSP's equal employment opportunity officer).
74. Id.
75. Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 460 (7th Cir. 2003).
76. Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2352.
77. Id. at 2351.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 2355.
80. Id. at 2353-54.
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ployer follows."' Consequently, where no adverse official action causes
a constructive discharge, employers may assert the Ellerth/Faragher
affirmative defense to a constructive discharge claim. 2
3. Significance
The Suders decision is a good news/bad news outcome. The good
news is that the "official act" line of demarcation is well-grounded in
policy considerations. The Suders standard builds on the policy artic-
ulated in Ellerth and Faragher of only imposing strict liability where
a supervisor engages in some objective use of agency authority on be-
half of an employer.8 3 Where harassment results from a supervisor's
official action, the employer bears a greater degree of responsibility
because it has empowered its "agent to make economic decisions af-
fecting other employees under his control."8 4 In addition, the employer
in this context has a greater ability to detect and prevent harassment
since official actions ordinarily are "documented in official company re-
cords and ... subject to review by higher level supervisors. "85
On the other hand, when a supervisor engages in harassing be-
havior that involves no official employment action, strict liability for
the employer is less appropriate. So, for example, if a supervisor ha-
rasses an employee through unwelcome verbal or physical conduct, the
supervisor is engaging in acts "which might be the same acts a co-
employee would commit [where] the supervisor's status [would] make
little difference." 6 Further, since the employer observes no objective
signal of a change in terms and conditions of employment in such cir-
cumstances, it has less opportunity to countermand the harassing be-
havior. In this context, accordingly, the employer should be liable only
if the victim reported the offensive conduct and provided the employer's
antiharassment policy a chance to correct the problem.
In terms of bad news, the "official action" test is an imprecise stan-
dard that likely will spawn considerable litigation. Unlike a traditional
tangible employment action such as a discharge or demotion that is
objectively ascertainable, the question of whether an "official action"
precipitated a constructive discharge in a particular case entails a sub-
jective assessment of causation. This may pose a difficult factual issue
in many circumstances. Take, for example, the situation of a male su-
pervisor who promotes a female employee to a previously all-male work
team that turns out not to be receptive to a female member. The co-
employees engage in a pattern of harassing behavior that makes the
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2354-55.
83. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08.
84. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 763.
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female employee's work life miserable. After three or four months, the
female employee resigns and asserts a hostile work environment claim.
Does this constructive discharge flow from the supervisor's official pro-
motion action or from the harassment perpetrated by the nonsupervi-
sory members of the work team? The causation element in this exam-
ple, as it will be in many other instances, simply is not clear.
This lack of predictability is aggravated by another aspect of the
Suders decision. The Court in Suders for the first time ruled that a
constructive discharge is actionable under Title VII. 7 While this result
is not surprising,"8 the Court's articulated standard for determining the
existence of a constructive discharge is somewhat surprising. Justice
Ginsburg stated that in order to establish a constructive discharge, the
plaintiff "must show that the abusive working environment became so
intolerable that her resignation qualified as a fitting response." 9 This
standard, although generally consistent with the approach adopted by
a majority of circuit courts,9" is a loose one that provides little guidance
for future outcomes. Courts undoubtedly will struggle in the coming
years to determine when a plaintiff's resignation is a "fitting response"
and when it is not.
C. The Americans with Disabilities Act
1. Holding
In Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez,9 1 the Supreme Court held in a 7-0
decision that an employment policy barring the rehire of employees
whose prior employment with the same employer terminated because
of a facially neutral workplace conduct rule does not establish a dis-
parate treatment claim under the ADA in the absence of evidence that
the policy was applied in a discriminatory manner.
9 2
87. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
88. The Court previously recognized the viability of constructive discharge claims
under the National Labor Relations Act, see Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 894
(1984), and many circuit court decisions had done the same with respect to Title VII, see,
e.g., Robinson v. Sappington, 351 F.3d 317, 336-37 (7th Cir. 2003); Moore v. KUKA Weld-
ing Sys., 171 F.3d 1073, 1080 (6th Cir. 1999).
89. Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2347.
90. See RICHARD T. SEYMOUR & JOHN F. ASLIN, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT LAW UPDATE
21-801 (BNA 2003) (stating that the standard adopted by a majority of circuit courts is
whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt forced to resign
because of the terms and conditions of employment to which the plaintiff was subject).
Some circuits, however, had required an element of employer intent to cause such a
resignation. See, e.g., Tork v. St. Luke's Hosp., 181 F.3d 918, 919 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding
that a plaintiff must prove that her employer "intentionally create[d] a work environment
so intolerable as to compel a reasonable employee to quit and the employee does in fact
quit"). Justice Thomas' dissenting opinion in Suders urged the adoption of such an intent
element. Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2357-59 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
91. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 124 S. Ct. 513 (2003).
92. Id., 124 S. Ct. at 519-20. Justices Souter and Breyer took no part in the decision.
Id. at 515.
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2. Context
Joel Hernandez had worked for Hughes Missile Systems for twenty-
five years when he tested positive for cocaine use in 1991.93 Fearing
the prospect of dismissal, he accepted Hughes' offer to resign in lieu of
termination.94 Hernandez reapplied to Hughes in 1994.9' His applica-
tion indicated previous employment with Hughes and included a letter
from Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) vouching that Hernandez regularly
attended meetings and was progressing in his recovery.96 Hughes re-
jected Hernandez's application for rehire after reviewing his personnel
file and learning of his previous cessation of employment for violating
a workplace conduct rule.97 The employee who reviewed the application
testified that she possessed no knowledge of Hernandez's prior drug
use or the reason for his termination. 9' Hughes stated that it maintains
a neutral policy against rehiring any employee who was terminated or
who resigns because of workplace misconduct. 99
Hernandez filed a charge with the EEOC, which issued a right-to-
sue letter. 100 The EEOC concluded that Hughes may have rejected Her-
nandez based on his record of past drug use and found "reasonable
cause to believe that [Hernandez] was denied hire ... because of his
disability."10 1
Hernandez filed suit in district court, advancing a disparate treat-
ment claim that Hughes rejected his application due to his record of
drug addiction or because Hughes regarded him as being a drug ad-
dict.1 02 In response to a summary judgment motion, Hernandez for the
first time argued that even if Hughes did apply a neutral no-rehire
policy, his rights were nevertheless violated because of the policy's dis-
parate impact.10 3 The district court granted summary judgment on
Hernandez's disparate treatment claim but refused to consider his dis-
parate impact claim because Hernandez did not plead that theory in a
timely manner.104
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's re-
fusal to consider Hernandez's disparate impact claim.' 0 5 The circuit
court then applied the McDonnell Douglas test to Hernandez's dispa-
93. Id. at 516.
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 517.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Sys. Co., 298 F.3d 1030, 1037 n.20 (9th Cir. 2002).
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rate treatment claim.' 0 6 The court first found that Hernandez's prima
facie case of discrimination sufficed to preclude summary judgment. 10 7
The court then moved to the test's second step, which shifts the burden
to the defendant to produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its employment action. ' 0 8 Hughes contended that its neutral
policy against rehiring any employee terminated for workplace miscon-
duct constituted such a reason.0 9 The court of appeals, however, re-
jected this contention, holding the no re-hire policy to be unlawful "as
applied to former drug addicts whose only work-related offense was
testing positive because of their addiction."
1 0
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Ninth Circuit
erred by "conflating the analytical framework for disparate-impact
and disparate-treatment claims.""' Writing for the majority, Justice
Thomas noted, the Court "has consistently recognized a distinction
between claims of discrimination based on disparate treatment and
claims of discrimination based on disparate impact."" 2 A disparate
treatment claim succeeds if the employer's actions are based on pro-
tected traits of employees." 3 Disparate impact claims arise when an
employment practice is facially neutral but nevertheless results in one
group being treated more harshly than another in the absence of busi-
ness necessity." 4 Though both disparate impact and disparate treat-
ment claims are cognizable under the ADA," 5 each involves distinct
factual issues requiring courts to carefully distinguish between the two
theories." 6
Hernandez's case was limited to a disparate treatment claim be-
cause of his failure to file a timely disparate impact claim." 7 The Ninth
Circuit, however, found Hughes' no-rehire policy unlawful by errone-
106. See Hernandez, 124 S. Ct. at 517-18. Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting approach, the plaintiff initially must establish a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion; if that burden is met, the defendant must produce evidence of a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the employment action; if that burden of production is satisfied,
the plaintiff then must demonstrate that the defendant's proffered reason is actually a
pretext for discrimination. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53
(1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973).
107. Hernandez, 298 F.3d at 1035.
108. See supra note 106.
109. Hernandez, 124 S. Ct. at 518.
110. Hernandez, 298 F.3d at 1036.
111. Hernandez, 124 S. Ct. at 519.
112. Id.
113. Id. (describing a disparate treatment claim as one where the "employer simply
treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex,
or [other protected characteristic]") (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977)).
114. Id.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (2000).
116. Hernandez, 124 S. Ct. at 519.
117. Id. at 519-20.
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ously applying disparate impact analysis."1 Specifically, the court of
appeals improperly focused on the extent by which the policy screens
out applicants with a history of addiction and the failure of the em-
ployer to raise a business necessity defense.' 1 9 Each of these "factors
pertains to disparate impact, not disparate treatment, claims.'
120
The Court held that Hughes' proffer of its neutral no-rehire policy
satisfied its obligation under the McDonnell Douglas framework to pro-
vide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not rehiring Hernan-
dez. 12 1 The only remaining issue, accordingly, was whether Hernandez
could show that Hughes made its hiring decision on the basis of Her-
nandez's status as disabled as opposed to its no-rehire policy.122 Rather
than deciding this issue, the Ninth Circuit improperly concluded that
the otherwise neutral policy was illegal as a matter of law.23 The Court
remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for a proper determination of
the case under the third step of the McDonnell Douglas framework.1
24
3. Significance
The Hernandez decision is unsatigfactory in a number of respects.
First, the decision tells us what we already knew; namely, that the
analysis of disparate treatment and disparate impact claims entails
distinct proof structures that are not interchangeable. The Supreme
Court had made a similar pronouncement in UAW v. Johnson Controls,
Inc. 125 In that case, the Court reversed a Seventh Circuit decision that
had applied the business necessity defense to a claim of facial discrim-
ination and ruled that the proper defense to a disparate treatment
claim is the narrower bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) stan-
dard. 2 6 While the Ninth Circuit's failure to heed that lesson in Her-
nandez certainly warranted a reminder, the Court's message is far
short of a blockbuster result.
The Hernandez decision also is unsatisfactory in that it does not
provide much in the way of guidance with respect to the substantive
issues surrounding the validity of no-rehire policies as applied to re-
covered addicts. While the Court suggests that an employer with a
blanket no-rehire rule that does not inquire or look at the particular
reason for an earlier separation in service is not liable for disparate
118. Id. at 520.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 521.
125. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
126. Id. at 197-200.
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treatment discrimination,12 7 it does not address the legality of an em-
ployer policy that, either on its fact or as applied, disqualifies applicants
seeking rehire who, in the past, have tested positive for illegal drug use
in a workplace drug test.' 28 Does such a policy constitute illegal status
discrimination on the basis of the applicant's record of addiction, or does
it constitute lawful action based upon the applicant's past history of
misconduct? And does the length of time during which the applicant
has been free of drug use have an impact on this determination? The
answers to these questions are not clear.
The status of a no-rehire policy under a disparate impact analysis
also is unclear. If Hernandez had filed a timely disparate impact claim,
the initial issue he would have faced would have been whether the no-
rehire rule disproportionately disqualifies individuals with a record of
addiction.' 2  A plaintiff may well be able to establish this threshold
showing in a workplace having an ongoing regimen of drug testing.'
30
If the disproportionate impact hurdle is cleared, the question then be-
comes whether the employer has a business necessity reason for the
no-rehire policy. 3' This may be a difficult showing for an employer in
many industries to make, particularly with respect to disabled appli-
127. Hernandez, 124 S. Ct. at 520 n.7 (stating that if the employer's human resource
screener "were truly unaware that [Hernandez's] disability existed, it would be impos-
sible for her hiring decision to have been based, even in part, on respondent's disability").
128. This issue is similar to that remanded by the Supreme Court in Hernandez to
the Ninth Circuit, see 124 S. Ct. at 520 (stating that "the only relevant question before
the Court of Appeals, after petitioner presented a neutral explanation for its decision not
to rehire respondent, was whether there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could
conclude that petitioner did not make its employment decision based on respondent's
status as disabled despite petitioner's proffered explanation"). On remand, the Ninth
Circuit concluded "that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Raytheon
failed to re-hire Hernandez because of his 'status as an alcoholic,' rather than in reliance
on a uniform no re-hire policy." Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Sys. Co., 362 F.3d 564, 568
(9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit, accordingly, remanded the case to the district court
for trial. Id. at 570.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (generally prohibiting the use of "qualification stan-
dards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out
an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities"); see also 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). Although only applicable by its terms to Title VII claims,
most courts considering the issue have applied the amendatory provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 to ADA cases. See PETER BLANCK ET AL., DISABILITY CML RIGHTS
LAw AND POLICY § 8.4 (2004).
130. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4D (According to EEOC guidelines, "A selection rate for
any [protected characteristic] which is less than four-fifths (4/5) of the rate for the group
with the highest rate will generally be regarded as evidence of adverse impact, while a
greater than four-fifths rate will generally not be regarded by Federal enforcement agen-
cies as evidence of adverse impact").
131. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (authorizing the use of "qualification standards, tests or
selection criteria [that have been shown to be] job related and consistent with business
necessity"). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (providing in Title VII, as amended
by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, that once the plaintiffshows that a specific practice causes
a disparate impact, the employer must "demonstrate that the challenged practice is job-
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity").
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cants who currently are not using illegal drugs and are qualified to
perform the job.
Finally, Hernandez does not provide any explicit guidance with re-
spect to the proper interpretation of the Court's controversial 2003 de-
cision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa.13 2 In that Title VII case, the Court
held that direct evidence of discrimination need not be presented in
order to support a mixed-motive jury instruction.133 Previously, many
courts had used the "same decision test" of Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins... in cases presenting direct evidence of discrimination, while us-
ing the three-prong McDonnell Douglas analysis when only circum-
stantial evidence of discrimination was available.1 35 Although some
courts have not found tension between Desert Palace and the Mc-
Donnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme,1 36 other courts have inter-
preted Desert Palace so as to find that the "same decision test" has
superseded the McDonnell Douglas formula for all disparate treatment
cases. 137 Still another group of decisions has staked out an intermediate
position by concluding that Desert Palace modifies McDonnell Douglas
only at the third step by asking whether the plaintiff can meet his or
her ultimate burden to prove discrimination. 13 Under either of these
latter two approaches, a trial court is likely to grant an employer's
motion for summary judgment only if the employee fails to raise a gen-
uine issue of material fact concerning whether or not a protected char-
acteristic was a motivating factor in the employment decision.1 39 The
Hernandez decision, by finding that the Ninth Circuit erred in not ad-
hering to the traditional McDonnell Douglas formula, seems to provide
implicit evidence that Desert Palace has not eradicated McDonnell
Douglas, but the lack of any direct reference to the current controversy
will keep this issue in limbo.
D. 42 U.S.C. Section 1981
1. Holding
In Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 140 the Supreme Court held
that 28 U.S.C. section 1658's four-year statute of limitations applies to
132. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S. Ct. 2148 (2003).
133. Id. at 101-02.
134. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
135. See, e.g., Mohr v. Dustrol, Inc., 306 F.3d 636, 639-40 (8th Cir. 2002); Mooney v.
Aramco Serv. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1216-17 (5th Cir. 1995).
136. See Roberson v. Alltel Info. Serv., 373 F.3d 647, 647 n.3 (5th Cir. 2004) (listing
cases).
137. See, e.g., Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987,992-93 (D. Minn.
2003).
138. See, e.g., Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004);
Dunbar v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers of Iowa, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1197-98 (N.D.
Iowa 2003).
139. See Rachid, 376 F.3d at 312.
140. Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 124 S. Ct. 1836 (2004).
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federal causes of action made possible by post-1990 statutory enact-
ments, including a 1991 amendment to 42 U.S.C. section 1981.141
2. Context
Jones was the named plaintiff in a class action brought against
R.R. Donnelley by several African Americans formerly employed at the
company's Chicago manufacturing division. 142 Plaintiffs alleged viola-
tions of their rights under 42 U.S.C. section 1981 as amended by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.143 Their claims included allegations of a ra-
cially hostile work environment, inferior employee status, and wrongful
termination. 4 4 The action was filed more than two years, but less than
four years, after the alleged occurrences.
145
Prior to being amended in 1991, the Court had ruled that section
1981 did not include causes of action relating to employment actions
occurring after the formation of an employment contract. 14 6 Thus,
plaintiff's claims alleging post-hire discrimination were not actionable
under the original version of section 1981.'14 The Civil Rights Act of
1991, however, amended section 1981 to include causes of action relat-
ing to the "termination of contracts and the enjoyment of all benefits,
privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship."
148
R.R. Donnelley moved for summary judgment, positing that plain-
tiff's claims were barred by Illinois's two-year statute of limitations.
149
Section 1981 does not contain an express statute of limitations. 150 Prior
to 1990, courts borrowed the appropriate state statute of limitations
for claims arising under federal statutes having no explicit limitation
period.' 5 ' In 1990, however, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. section 1658-
known as the "catch-all" statute of limitations-providing a four-year
statute of limitations for "a civil action arising under an Act of Congress
enacted after [December 1, 1990]." 1 52 R.R. Donnelley argued that sec-
tion 1658's four-year statute of limitations applied only to new causes
of action arising independently of previously enacted statutes. 153 Thus,
the key issue in the case was whether or not plaintiff's cause of action
141. Id. at 1837.
142. Id. at 1839.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 1839.
146. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (holding that the
statutory right to make and enforce contracts did not protect against harassing conduct
that occurred after the formation of the contract).
147. See Jones, 124 S. Ct. at 1840.
148. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2000).
149. Jones, 124 S. Ct. at 1839.
150. See id. at 1839-40.
151. Id. at 1839.
152. 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2000).
153. Jones, 124 S. Ct. at 1839.
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"arose] under the 1991 Act or under § 1981 as originally enacted" in
1866.154
The district court applied the four-year statute of limitations to
plaintiff's claims, but the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the 1991 amendments to section 1981 simply redefined
terms in the original statute without altering the text that "provides
the basic right of recovery for an individual whose constitutional rights
have been violated."'5 5 Under this view, petitioners' claims were time
barred.56
The Supreme Court reversed. 157 Writing for the Court, Justice Ste-
vens acknowledged that ambiguity attached to section 1658's applica-
tion to actions "arising under" an act of Congress.1 5 To resolve this
ambiguity, the Court reviewed the context in which section 1658 was
enacted. 1 9 Prior to section 1658, the lack of a uniform statute of limi-
tations applicable to federal causes of action generated considerable
litigation. 60 Applying state statutes of limitations raised a number of
difficult issues including conflict of law disputes, questions regarding
tolling, and disputes over which of the forum state's statutes was con-
trolling. 61 Congress, accordingly, enacted section 1658 in response to
these and other problems generated by the practice of borrowing state
statutes of limitations.
1 62
The Court found that restricting section 1658's applicability to
post-1990 statutes establishing causes of action independent of preex-
isting law, as the Seventh Circuit had ruled, would subvert the intent
of Congress. 163 The Court noted that: (1) nothing in the text or history
of section 1658 supports the court of appeals' limited reading of section
1658's applicability and (2) "Congress routinely creates new rights of
action by amending existing statutes."164 Thus, the Court concluded
that a cause of action "aris[es] under an Act of Congress enacted after
December 1, 1990-and therefore is governed by § 1658's 4 year statute
of limitations-if the plaintiff's claim against the defendant was made
possible by a post-1990 enactment."16 5 Here, petitioners' claims under
section 1981 were made possible only because of the 1991 amendments
to section 1981.166 Therefore, the petitioners' claims "a[rose] under an
154. Id. at 1840.
155. Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 305 F.3d 717, 727 (7th Cir. 2002).
156. See id.
157. Jones, 124 S. Ct. at 1846.
158. Id. at 1841.
159. See id. at 1841-46.
160. Id. at 1842-43.
161. Id. at 1843-44.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 1845.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1845-46.
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Act of Congress enacted after [December 1, 1990]," and section 1658's
four-year statute of limitations applies.
16 7
3. Significance
The Jones decision underscores the Court's preference for utilizing
a uniform statute of limitations for claims arising under federal stat-
utes lacking an express limitations period. While section 1658, the stat-
ute providing for the uniform four-year statute of limitations, only ap-
plies to claims "arising under" federal laws enacted after December 1,
1990,168 the Court's determination that this rule encompasses claims
sanctioned by amendments to statutes predating 1990 suggests that
the Court is likely to invoke the four-year rule whenever such is ar-
guably defensible.
The Court's preference for such an outcome is understandable. The
alternative practice of borrowing the most analogous state statute of
limitations is unpredictable and "has spawned a vast amount of liti-
gation."16 9 In addition to the difficulty of identifying the closest state
analogue statute, the practice of borrowing raises many attendant un-
certainties such as the need to determine conflicts of law and tolling
issues.17 The uniform federal solution, in contrast, is clear and un-
ambiguous. In a nutshell, the Court's preference for the four-year fed-
eral solution is a good policy choice.
E. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
1. Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004)
A. HOLDING
In Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila,7 ' the Supreme Court held that
state law claims challenging medical coverage decisions under an ER-
ISA health plan were preempted by ERISA and thus removable to fed-
eral court.
B. CONTEXT
Juan Davila and Ruby Calad (respondents) received health cov-
erage from ERISA-regulated employee benefit plans, with Davila a par-
ticipant in a plan administered by Aetna Health, Inc., and Calad a
beneficiary in a plan administered by CIGNA Healthcare of Texas, Inc.
(petitioners).17 2 Davila and Calad sued separately in Texas state court
claiming they sustained injuries proximately caused by their providers'
failure to "exercise ordinary care when making health care treatment
decisions" in violation of the Texas Health Care Liability Act (THCLA)
167. Id.
168. 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2000).
169. Jones, 124 S. Ct. at 1842.
170. Id. at 1842-44.
171. Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004).
172. Id. at 2493.
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section 88.002(a) and seeking to recover damages. 173 Davila alleged
that he sustained severe internal injuries as a result of Aetna's refusal
to authorize payment for the medication Vioxx, prescribed by his doctor
to ameliorate arthritis pain. 174 Calad alleged she suffered complica-
tions following surgery as a result of CIGNA's denial of the extended
hospital stay recommended by her treating physician.1 75
Arguing that Davila's and Calad's claims were entirely preempted
by ERISA section 502(a), petitioners sought to remove the cases to fed-
eral district court.17 The district court agreed and, when respondents
declined to amend their complaints to bring specific ERISA claims, dis-
missed both cases with prejudice. 17 7 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed, holding that respondents'
claims did not fall within the scope of section 502(a). 17' According to the
court of appeals, state causes of action are fully preempted only when
they rather precisely duplicate those authorized by section 502(a). 179
The circuit court, relying on Pegram v. Herdrich,18° found respondents'
claims did not fall within section 502(a)(2), permitting suit against a
plan fiduciary for breach of fiduciary duty, 1 ' because the state law
claims asserted mixed issues of plan eligibility and appropriate health
care treatment decisions.182 The court found section 502(a)(1)(B), pro-
viding a cause of action for breach of contract where benefits are
wrongly denied, equally inapplicable in that respondents' state law
claims were grounded in tort. 
1 8 3
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed. Writing for the Court,
Justice Thomas referred to ERISA's expansive preemption provisions,18 4
enacted in accordance with ERISA's purpose of "provid[ing] a uniform
regulatory regime over employee benefit plans."18 5 To achieve this de-
sired uniformity, ERISA's preemption provisions are "intended to en-
sure that employee benefit plan regulation [is] 'exclusively a federal
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. A nurse employed by CIGNA determined that Calad did not meet her health
plan's requirements for an extended hospital stay. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2002).
179. Id. at 310-11.
180. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
181. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a) (2000).
182. Roark, 307 F.3d at 307-08. The Fifth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's
decision in Pegram, 530 U.S. at 211, where the Court ruled that claims based on mixed
issues of eligibility and treatment were not fiduciary in nature and hence were not en-
forceable under § 502(a)(2).
183. Roark, 307 F.3d at 309.
184. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000).
185. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2495.
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concern."'18 6 Section 502(a) carries a particularly strong preemptive
force in that it "converts state causes of action into federal ones for
purposes of determining the propriety of removal."1"7 Consequently,
"causes of action within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of
§ 502(a) [are completely preempted and] removable to federal court."1 '
The Court found that petitioners' claims fit within § 502(a)(1)(B),
which allows participants or beneficiaries to bring suit to obtain plan
benefits wrongfully denied. 8 9 Here, respondents' claims were based on
the denial of medical services only available to them through the terms
of an ERISA-regulated benefit plan. ° As a result, respondents could
have employed section 502(a)(1)(B) to seek an injunction to obtain
treatment or to recoup the out-of-pocket costs paid for wrongfully de-
nied services.19 1 According to Justice Thomas, "if an individual, at some
point in time, could have brought his claim under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B),
and where there is no other independent legal duty that is implicated
by a defendant's actions, then the individual's cause of action is com-
pletely preempted by ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). 192
The Court rejected respondents' contention that the "duty of ordi-
nary care" prescribed by the THCLA constituted an independent legal
duty.1 93 Section 88.002(d) of the THCLA states that health insurance
carriers possess no obligation to provide treatment not covered by the
plan itself.194 Aetna and CIGNA denied the contested treatments on
the grounds that the respondents' plans did not provide for such treat-
ments under the circumstances.1 95 Section 502(a)(1)(B) entitled respon-
dents to contest this characterization of the plan's benefit provisions.
Accordingly, the THCLA created no independent legal duty and was
thus entirely preempted by ERISA.19
Finally, the Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's view that HMOs are
not considered fiduciaries subject to ERISA when making mixed eligi-
186. Id. (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981)).
187. Id. at 2496.
188. Id. (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1987)).
189. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2496.
190. Id. at 2497.
191. Id. at 2496.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 2497-98.
194. Id. at 2498.
195. Id.
196. Id. In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Fifth Circuit relied heavily on an
erroneous interpretation of Rush Prudential, believing the case to hold that state law
causes of action were not preempted unless they were identical to causes of action within
ERISA. Id. at 2499-50 (citing Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002)).
Rejecting this interpretation, Justice Thomas observed that "[n]owhere in Rush Pruden-
tial did we suggest that the pre-emptive force of ERISA § 502(a) is limited to the situation
in which a state cause of action precisely duplicates a cause of action under ERISA
§ 502(a)." Id.
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bility decisions. 1 97 The Fifth Circuit relied heavily on the Court's de-
cision in Pegram in reaching this conclusion, but the Court found Pe-
gram to be readily distinguishable. The Court, in that case, found that
ERISA does not provide a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty
where a physician employed by a health plan and acting as a treating
physician was negligent in making a mixed eligibility and treatment
decision akin to medical malpractice. 198 In contrast, the key to the dis-
pute in Davila was the HMO's determination of whether or not Davila
was eligible for treatment under the plan.'99 Such eligibility determi-
nations, according to the Court, are "part and parcel of the ordinary
fiduciary responsibilities connected to the administration of a plan."2 ° °
Accordingly, since the eligibility claims at issue in Davila are enforce-
able under ERISA, they completely preempt the purported state law
claims.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Ginsburg stated that while she
joined in the Court's decision, she also joined with several federal court
opinions that have urged Congress to revisit ERISA to ensure that the
statute provides make-whole relief.20
1
C. SIGNIFICANCE
The Davila decision confronts the contentious realm of health care
claims and remedies. In order to gauge the significance of this decision,
a brief review of the preexisting legal landscape is necessary.
As a general matter, ERISA preempts the field of health care
claims administration, but not that of claims asserting medical mal-
practice in the delivery of medical treatment. A "quantity" versus "qual-
ity" distinction provides a convenient frame of reference that has been
followed by a number of courts.20 2 Section 502(a) of ERISA may redress
a claim asserting that a health care plan improperly denied a quantity
of the benefits due under a plan.20 3 Indeed, the strength of the ERISA
framework is demonstrated by the fact that any state law claim chal-
lenging plan coverage is completely preempted, such that the state law
claim is converted to a federal claim and removable to federal court.20 4
On the other hand, a claim asserting that an individual received medi-
cal care of a substandard quality, such as a claim for medical malprac-
197. Id. at 2500-01.
198. Id. (citing Pegram, 530 U.S. at 211).
199. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2492.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 2503 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
202. Jane M. Mulcahy, The ERISA Preemption Question: Why Some HMO Members
Are Dying for Congress to Amend ERISA, 82 MARQ. L. REv. 877, 886 (1999).
203. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000); see, e.g., Sofo v. Pan-Am. Life Ins. Co., 13 F.3d 239,
240-41 (7th Cir. 1994).
204. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1987).
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tice against a treating physician, does not implicate ERISA and may
be pursued as a state law tort claim.2 °5
The distinction between quantity and quality is imprecise, how-
ever, and tends to blur when issues of eligibility and treatment overlap.
The zone of uncertainty increased in 2000 when the Supreme Court
ruled in Pegram that an HMO is not liable under ERISA for a breach
of fiduciary duty when its physician owners make "mixed eligibility and
treatment decisions."20 6 Although not a preemption case, some courts
have construed Pegram to mean that ERISA does not preempt a state
law medical malpractice claim challenging a mixed eligibility and treat-
ment decision in the form of a medical opinion that serves to deny cov-
erage under an ERISA health plan. 20 7 The Fifth Circuit, in the case
leading to the Davila decision, essentially adopted this construction.2 °"
If the Supreme Court would have affirmed the Fifth Circuit, such
a decision would have had the blockbuster effect of opening up medical
malpractice liability for medically based health plan coverage deci-
sions, even when not made by a treating physician. This result would
have affected a sea change in terms of permitting tort damages against
ERISA health plans for improper denials of treatment. 20 9 Such a de-
cision also would have had significant cost reverberations throughout
the already financially stressed health care industry.
2 10
While the Court's endorsement of the status quo in Davila falls
short of a blockbuster result,2 11 it nonetheless is the most significant of
this term's labor and employment decisions. The Court's opinion clar-
ifies the dicta in Pegram and nips the expansion of tort liability for
mixed coverage and treatment decisions in the bud. Most significantly,
205. See, e.g., Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc. v. Lewis, 77 F.3d 493 (10th Cir.
1996). A state law malpractice claim also may be asserted against a plan that employs
or has a sufficient agency relationship with a treating physician on vicarious liability
grounds. See, e.g., Pacificare of Okla., Inc., v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 154 (10th Cir. 1995).
206. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 229.
207. See, generally, Land v. CIGNA Healthcare of Florida, 339 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir.
2003); Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2003). But cf DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare,
346 F.3d 442, 450 (3d Cir. 2003) (disagreeing with this interpretation and finding that
the relevant question for preemption purposes is whether the claim could have been
subject to enforcement under ERISA § 502(a)).
208. Roark, 307 F.3d at 315.
209. Courts traditionally have found that claims alleging that a plan negligently
denied medical treatment are, in essence, denial-of-benefits claims subject to ERISA pre-
emption. See, e.g., Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996);
Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
210. See Matthew J. Binette, Patients' Bill of Rights: Legislative Cure-All or Pre-
scription for Disaster? 81 N.C.L. REV. 653, 693-96 (2003) (cautioning that an expansion
of liability for health plans similar to that envisioned by the Fifth Circuit in interpreting
the THCLA could have a profound cost impact on HMOs and managed care plans).
211. See Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2503 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (stating that she joins
the Court's opinion because "[t]hat decision is consistent with our governing case law on
ERISA's preemptive scope").
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the Davila Court firmly tosses the hot potato of health care reform back
to Congress.212
Thus far, Congress has debated but been unable to pass a federal
"patients' bill of rights. '213 Sound policy considerations support some
type of expanded remedies for patients wrongfully denied medical treat-
ment under a managed health care plan. Take, for example, the case of
a patient whose treating physician recommends an organ transplant
but whose health care plan denies coverage for such a procedure based
upon the negligent preutilization review of another, nontreating health
care professional. If the patient dies a month later, what remedies are
available to his estate? The answer is virtually none. The estate cannot
successfully maintain a state law malpractice claim against the treat-
ing physician because that doctor recommended the needed transplant.
In addition, under Davila, any attempted malpractice claim against the
plan for a mixed eligibility and treatment decision is treated as a claim
for benefits and completely preempted by ERISA.21 4
The estate's only viable claims are those provided by ERISA section
502(a). But the available ERISA claims lack any practical clout. Section
502(a) provides that a plan beneficiary may only "recover benefits due
him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms
of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of
the plan."215 Monetary damages are not available.21 6 Thus, our hypo-
thetical patient could have sought injunctive relief to compel the plan
to provide the transplant, but the emergency timeframe makes this
option practically unavailable. Alternatively, the patient could have
paid for the procedure himself and then sued for reimbursement. For
most individuals, this option is financially unfeasible. In the end, the
patient and his estate are left with no real remedy. Some congressional
action is sorely needed to redress this injustice.
Finally, the Davila decision also is significant in that it runs
counter to the Court's recent trend of restricting the scope of ERISA
preemption. Following two decades of Supreme Court decisions recog-
nizing a very expansive scope of ERISA preemption, the Court in 1995
signaled a retreat of sorts and began issuing a string of decisions adopt-
ing a narrower conception of ERISA preemption.2 1 7 Whether Davila
212. Id. (stating "I also join 'the rising judicial chorus urging that Congress and [this]
Court revisit what is an unjust and increasingly tangled ERISA regime'"; DiFelice v.
Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 453 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., concurring)).
213. See Binette, supra note 210, at 689-93 (discussing congressional proposals for
a "patients' bill of rights").
214. See supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
215. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000).
216. Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 248 (1993) (holding that ERISA's au-
thorization of"other appropriate equitable relief" in § 502(a)(3) does not include a dam-
ages remedy).
217. See Stephen F. Befort & Christopher J. Kopka, The Sounds of Silence: The
Libertarian Ethos of ERISA Preemption, 52 FLA. L. REV. 1, 10-21 (2000).
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represents another change in direction or simply a result-oriented
anomaly remains to be seen.
2. Central Laborers' Pension Fund v. Heinz, 124 S. Ct. 2230
(2004)
A. HOLDING
In Central Laborers' Pension Fund v. Heinz,21' the Supreme Court
unanimously held that ERISA's "anti-cutback" rule21 9 bars pension
plan amendments expanding the categories of postretirement employ-
ment triggering suspension of previously accrued early retirement
benefits.220
B. CONTEXT
Construction worker Thomas Heinz participated in a multiem-
ployer pension plan (Plan) administered by the Central Laborers' Pen-
sion Fund.221 After accumulating sufficient pension credits to receive
full early retirement benefits, Heinz retired from the construction in-
dustry in 1996.222 By the Plan's terms, Heinz's monthly retirement
benefits were subject to suspension if he participated in any "disqual-
ifying employment" after retiring.223 At the time of Heinz's retirement,
the Plan stipulated that such employment included any job as a "union
or non-union construction worker."
Shortly after his retirement, Heinz accepted a job as a construction
supervisor.224 For nearly two years, the Plan continued to pay Heinz's
monthly pension payment while he worked as a supervisor.22 5 In 1998,
however, the Plan expanded its definition of "disqualifying employ-
ment" to include any job "in any capacity in the construction indus-
try. 2 26 After warning Heinz that continued work as a construction su-
pervisor would result in suspension of his benefits, warnings Heinz did
not heed, the Plan ceased its payments.227
Heinz filed suit to recover the suspended benefits, claiming that
the Plan's amendment deprived him of accrued benefits in violation of
ERISA's anticutback rule. 22' The district court held in favor of the Plan,
but a divided panel of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
on the grounds that post-hoc restrictions on access to accrued benefits
violated the anticutback rule. 229
218. Central Laborers' Pension Fund v. Heinz, 124 S. Ct. 2230 (2004).
219. 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g) (2000).
220. Heinz, 124 S. Ct. at 2234.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 2234-35.
229. Heinz v. Central Laborers' Pension Fund, 303 F. 3d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 2002).
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The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit.2 3 ° Writing for
the Court, Justice Souter noted that protecting "employees' justified
expectation of receiving the benefits their employers promise them" is
one of the paramount goals of ERISA.231 The anticutback provision is
critically important to this objective, providing that "[tihe accrued ben-
efit of a participant under a plan may not be decreased by an amend-
ment of the plan .... This protection extends to early retirement
benefits following amendments included in the Retirement Equity Act
of 1984.233 Specifically, section 1054(g)(2) provides that "a plan amend-
ment which has the effect of... eliminating or reducing an early re-
tirement benefit ... with respect to benefits attributable to service be-
fore the amendment shall be treated as reducing accrued benefits."
234
Justice Souter concluded that the Plan's 1998 amendments, ex-
panding the definition of "disqualifying employment," violated section
1054(g)(2). 235 Though the statute itself does not define "early retire-
ment benefit" or "accrued benefit" with great clarity, the Court agreed
with the Seventh Circuit's commonsense conclusion that "placing ma-
terially greater restrictions on the receipt of the benefit 'reduces' the
benefit just as surely as a decrease in the size of the monthly benefit
payment."23 6 Heinz reasonably relied on the Plan's terms in planning
his retirement.237 Subsequent modification of the plan to his detriment
undermined this reliance, forcing Heinz to choose between receiving
benefit payments and working in the only industry with which he was
familiar.238 According to Justice Souter, "[wle simply do not see how, in
any practical sense, this change of terms could not be viewed as shrink-
ing the value of Heinz's pension rights and reducing his promised
benefits."239
The Court rejected the Plan's technical arguments. Specifically, the
Plan argued that the anticutback rule applied only to amendments that
modified the nominal dollar amount of a pensioner's monthly pay-
ment.240 Justice Souter dismissed this interpretation as overly narrow,
noting that by the Plan's logic, benefits could be permanently sus-
230. Heinz, 124 S. Ct. at 2235.
231. Id.
232. 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g)(1) (2000).
233. Heinz, 124 S. Ct. at 2235.
234. 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g)(2) (2000).
235. Heinz, 124 S. Ct. at 2236.
236. Id. at 2235 (quoting Heinz, 303 F. 3d at 805).
237. Heinz, 124 S. Ct. at 2236.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. (arguing, "[a] retiree's benefit of $100 a month ... is not reduced by a post
accrual plan amendment that suspends payments, so long as nothing affects the figure
of $100 defining what he would have been paid, if paid at all").
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pended so long as the dollar amount a retiree would receive absent
suspension remained constant.24 '
C. SIGNIFICANCE
The Heinz fact scenario, similar to that of Cline, illustrates what
increasingly is becoming a common phenomenon: employers attempt-
ing to contain or reduce the cost of benefits previously conferred. Unlike
the Cline outcome, however, the employer's efforts in Heinz proved to
be unsuccessful.
In this case, the employer's attempted benefit reduction ran afoul
of ERISA's core objective of requiring employers and other plan spon-
sors to keep promises upon which employees have relied.242 The Court
underscored this objective with the following quote taken from two ear-
lier decisions:
Nothing in ERISA requires employers to establish employee benefit
plans. Nor does ERISA mandate what kind of benefits employers
must provide if they choose to have such a plan. ERISA does, however,
seek to ensure that employees will not be left empty-handed once
employers have guaranteed them certain benefits.... [Wihen Con-
gress enacted ERISA it 'wanted to ... mak[e] sure that if a worker
has been promised a defined pension benefit upon retirement-and
if he has fulfilled whatever conditions are required to obtain a vested
benefit-he actually will receive it.'
2 4
'
The Court in Heinz ultimately determined that "an amendment placing
materially greater restrictions on the receipt of the benefit" violates this
principle "just as surely as a decrease in the size of the monthly benefit
payment."
244
It is important to recognize that the limitation imposed by the an-
ticutback rule only applies to benefits that have accrued. 24' By their
nature, welfare or nonpension benefits usually do not accrue. Accord-
ingly, "employers are perfectly free to modify the deal they are offering
their employees, as long as the change goes to the terms of compensa-
tion for continued, future employment."246 Thus, based on the Heinz
decision, employers would not be precluded from reducing the amount
of benefits provided by a health care plan for current employees, at least
in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement. But pension and
other deferred benefits frequently do accrue, and employers who seek
241. Id.
242. Id. at 2235.
243. Id. (quoting Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887 (1996) (quoting Nach-
man Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 375 (1980)).
244. Id. at 2236 (quoting Heinz, 303 F.3d at 805).
245. See 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g) (2000); see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.411(d)-4 (stating that a
plan "may be amended to eliminate or reduce section 411(d)(6) protected benefits with
respect to benefits not yet accrued").
246. Heinz, 124 S. Ct. at 2237.
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to alter the nature or amount of those benefits, such as by switching
from a traditional defined benefit to a cash balance plan, must be
careful not to diminish the value of those benefits that already have
accrued.2 47
3. Yates v. Hendon, 124 S. Ct. 1330 (2004).
A. HOLDING
In Yates v. Hendon,248 the Supreme Court held that a working
owner of a business qualifies as a participant in a benefit plan covered
by ERISA, so long as the plan covers one or more employees other
than the business owner and his or her spouse.24 9 Justices Scalia and
Thomas each filed concurring opinions.2 5 °
B. CONTEXT
Dr. Raymond B. Yates was the sole shareholder and president of a
professional corporation. 251 Yates' corporation provided a profit-sharing
plan (Plan) administered by Yates, who also served as the Plan's
trustee.25 2 At all times, participants in the Plan included at least one
person other than Yates or his wife. 253 The Plan included an anti-
alienation provision, as required by both the Internal Revenue Code 25
4
and Title I of ERISA,25 5 providing that "no benefit or interest available
hereunder will be subject to assignment or alienation, either voluntar-
ily or involuntarily., 2
5 6
In 1989, Yates borrowed $20,000 from the Plan. Per the loan's
terms, Yates was to make monthly payments over a five-year period.257
He renewed the loan for five years in 1992.258 Yates made no payments
on the loan until 1996, when he made two payments totaling $50,467,
paying off the loan's principal and interest due. 259 The money used for
the payments came from proceeds from the sale of Yates' home.260
Shortly after Yates repaid the loan, his creditors filed an involuntary
bankruptcy petition against him.26 1 Hendon, the bankruptcy trustee,
filed a complaint against the Plan and Yates alleging that Yates' recent
lump-sum payment of the loan constituted a preferential transfer to
247. See generally Cooper v. IBM Pers. Pension Plan, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (S.D. Ill.
2003).
248. Yates v. Hendon, 124 S. Ct. 1330 (2004).
249. Id. at 1335.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1336.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) (2000).
255. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (2000).
256. Yates, 124 S. Ct. at 1336.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1336-37.
259. Id. at 1337.
260. Id.
261. Id.
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the Plan.26 2 Hendon asked the bankruptcy court to order the Plan (and
Yates as trustee) to pay the sum of $50,467.46 to Hendon.2 63
The bankruptcy court, after concluding that Yates' repayment of
the loan qualified as a preferential transfer under 11 U.S.C. section
547(b),264 ruled that the Plan's anti-alienation provision could not pre-
vent Hendon from recovering the loan repayment because Yates did not
qualify as a plan participant for the purposes of ERISA coverage. 265 As
the self-employed owner of the corporation sponsoring the Plan, the
court reasoned, Yates was disqualified from participating in the Plan
as an employee under ERISA.2 66 Thus, Yates could not rely on ERISA's
anti-alienation provisions to restrict transfer of the loan repayment.2 67
The district court and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.268
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, reversed the Sixth Circuit,
holding that a working owner of a business-in this case the business's
sole shareholder and president-may qualify as a participant in an
ERISA-covered benefit plan.269 Finding ERISA's definitions of "em-
ployee" and "participant" uninformative, Justice Ginsburg arrived at
her holding by reviewing other provisions within ERISA.27 °
Justice Ginsburg noted that well before ERISA's passage, certain
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code permitted sole proprietors to
participate in tax-qualified pension plans.27 1 In enacting ERISA, Con-
gress' "objective was to harmonize ERISA with [these] longstanding tax
provisions."27 2 Justice Ginsburg also found evidence from within ER-
ISA itself, citing a number of Title I provisions that "partially exempt
certain plans in which working owners likely participate from other-
wise mandatory [ERISA] provisions. "273 Such exemptions would be su-
perfluous if ERISA barred working owners from participating in any
such plans.274
Certain provisions of Title IV of ERISA further support the conclu-
sion that working owners are not barred from participating in ERISA
qualified benefit plans.2 7 5 Significantly, Title IV and the Internal Rev-
enue Code strongly indicate that "a working owner may have dual
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 1335.
270. Id. at 1339.
271. Id. Justice Ginsburg noted that under the Internal Revenue Code, working
owners have been eligible to participate in tax-qualified pension plans since 1942. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 1340-41.
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status, i.e., he can be an employee entitled to participate in a plan and,
at the same time, the employer . .. who established the plan."276 The
Court explained that the Sixth Circuit's interpretation derived from an
erroneous reading of 29 C.F.R. section 2510.3-3 that a working owner
could not be classified as an employee of his business for ERISA pur-
poses.2 77 Contrary to the Sixth Circuit, a 1999 advisory opinion by the
Department of Labor read 29 C.F.R. section 2510.3-3 to mean that Title
I of ERISA did not apply to plans where only the working owner and
his or her spouse were participants.7 The Court ultimately concluded
that where one or more common law employees, as here, also partici-
pate in the plan, the plan "fall[s] entirely within ERISA's compass."279
Justice Ginsburg also faulted Sixth Circuit precedent for errone-
ously relying on ERISA's anti-inurement provision, which "prohibits
plan assets from inuring to the benefit of employers."28 0 The Sixth Cir-
cuit read the anti-inurement provision as a broad bar on the partici-
pation of working owners in ERISA-sponsored pension plans.281 Ac-
cording to Justice Ginsburg, however, "the anti-inurement provision
does not preclude Title I coverage of working owners as plan partici-
pants."28 2 Instead, "the provision demands only that plan assets be held
for supplying benefits to plan participants."28 3 ERISA's anti-inurement
provision is intended to prevent fiduciary breaches, not to prohibit
working owners from participating in ERISA-protected plans on an
equal basis with other employees.28 4
C. SIGNIFICANCE
Justice Ginsburg's opinion conveniently provided its own assess-
ment of the benefits flowing from the Yates decision. The Court stressed
two benefits in particular. First, the Court noted that its decision fur-
thers "Congress' aim" by encouraging the creation of ERISA benefit
plans. 285 As the Court stated, "[tihe working employer's opportunity
personally to participate and gain ERISA coverage serves as an incen-
tive to the creation of plans that will benefit employer and non-owner
employees alike."28 6 Second, the Court's ruling "avoids the anomaly
that the same plan will be controlled by discrete [legal] regimes."28 7
276. Id. at 1341.
277. Id. at 1342.
278. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Advisory Opinion 99-04A, 26 BNA Pens. & Ben. Rep.
(BNA) 559.
279. Yates, 124 S. Ct. at 1344.
280. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (2000).
281. Yates, 124 S. Ct. at 1344.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1345.
285. Id. at 1333.
286. Id. at 1333-34.
287. Id. at 1334.
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This anomaly would have occurred under the Sixth Circuit's reading of
the statute because ERISA would govern that portion of the plan ap-
plicable to nonowner employees, while state law would govern the
owner's rights under the plan.28 Such a dichotomy, the Court sug-
gested, would generate administrative difficulties and run counter to
ERISA's goal of establishing a uniform national treatment of employee
benefit plans.
289
While these goals are undoubtedly laudatory, it remains to be seen
whether the ruling in Yates produces the unintended consequence of
sheltering Mr. Yates' questionable behavior. His conduct in taking an
interest-free loan from the Plan for seven years and then repaying the
loan out of the proceeds from the sale of his home on the eve of bank-
ruptcy proceedings fails a basic smell test. Yet, Justice Ginsburg is cor-
rect in concluding that the mere possibility of self-dealing alone should
establish "no categorical barrier to working owner participation in
ERISA plans."290 She noted that whether Yates himself had violated
the anti-inurement provision was one of the issues to be determined on
remand to the lower courts.29 1
F. Nonemployment Decisions
1. Scarborough v. Principi, 124 S. Ct. 1856 (2004)
In Scarborough v. Principi,2 92 the Supreme Court made it easier
for a prevailing party in an action against the United States to recover
attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). Under that
statute, a prevailing party must file an application within thirty days
of the respective action's final judgment.293 The EAJA specifies that the
application must include (1) a showing that the applicant's net worth
did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the action was filed,2 94 (2) a state-
ment of the amount sought,29 5 and (3) an allegation "that the position
of the United States was not substantially justified."29 6 The Court in
Scarborough held that a timely application may be amended after ex-
piration of the thirty-day filing period to allege that the government's
position in the underlying litigation lacked substantial justification.29 7
The Court's decision represents a victory of substance over form
and builds upon two other recent decisions in which the Court applied
288. Id. (explaining that if a working owner is not a plan participant subject to
ERISA, then state law relating to the working owner's interest in the plan is not pre-
empted).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 1345.
291. Id.
292. Scarborough v. Principi, 124 S. Ct. 1856 (2004).
293. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (2000).
294. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (2000).
295. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (2000).
296. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2000).
297. Scarborough, 124 S. Ct. at 1856.
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the relation-back doctrine to allow curative amendments subsequent
to filing deadlines. 29 In Scarborough, the Court reviewed the legisla-
tive rationale for enacting the EAJA, finding that Congress sought "to
eliminate the barriers that prohibit small businesses and individuals
from securing vindication of their rights in civil actions and adminis-
trative proceedings brought by or against the Federal Government." 99
The Court found that permitting a post-filing amendment advances
Congress' purpose in enacting the EAJA. The requirement that fee ap-
plicants allege that the government's position in the underlying liti-
gation was not substantially justified serves as a mere pleading re-
quirement, "ward[ing] off irresponsible litigation." 00 To defeat a fee
application on the merits, the government knows from the outset it
must prove its position was substantially justified.0 1 Thus, the require-
ment in question "does not serve an essential notice-giving function."
30 2
The decision has relevance for employees seeking access to govern-
ment benefits or programs. The Scarborough outcome will enable an
employee who, for example, has wrongfully been denied Social Security
disability benefits, to pursue a claim against the federal government
more easily.
2. Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004)
The Supreme Court's decision in Tennessee v. Lane is the latest in
a series of cases interpreting the reach of the Eleventh Amendment
with respect to barring suits against state defendants under a variety
of federal statutes. The decision also illustrates the impact of an egre-
gious set of facts.
George Lane and Beverly Jones (respondents) are paraplegics.30 3
Respondents alleged that the state of Tennessee and various counties
within the state violated their rights under Title II of the ADA by de-
nying them physical access to the state's courts on the basis of their
disability.3 0 4 Lane faced criminal charges and was required to appear
in a court located on the second floor of a county courthouse. 30 5 With
no elevator available, Lane crawled up the courthouse stairs to attend
298. Id. at 1865-68; see Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757 (2001) (holding that a
pro se litigant who failed to sign a timely filed notice of appeal could add the required
signature even after the time for filing the notice expired); Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll.,
535 U.S. 106 (2002) (extending relation-back concept to affirmation requirement attach-
ing to Title VII discrimination claims).
299. Scarborough, 124 S. Ct. at 1861 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96-1005, at 9 (1980)).
300. Id. at 1866.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 1867.
303. Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1982 (2004).
304. Id.
305. Id.
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his first appearance. 30 6 For a required second appearance, Lane refused
to again pull himself up the courthouse steps. 30 7 As a result, he was
arrested for failure to appear.308 Jones, who works as a court reporter,
claimed that lack of disability access to several county courthouses cost
her both work opportunities and the ability to participate in the judicial
process.309
Respondents brought suit in district court, seeking damages and
equitable relief.310 Tennessee moved for dismissal, claiming immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment.3 11 When the district court denied its
motion, Tennessee appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which held the case in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's decision
in Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett.3 12 In Garrett,
the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment immunized
states against private suits seeking money damages for alleged state
violations of Title I of the ADA, which protects the disabled from em-
ployment discrimination.31 3 The Garrett Court, however, left unresolved
whether or not the Eleventh Amendment barred damages in law for
suits brought under Title 1I.314
Title II provides that "no qualified individual with a disability
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or
be denied the benefits of the services, programs or activities of a public
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity."3 15 Inter-
preting Garrett to "bar private ADA suits against states based on equal
protection principles, but not those that rely on due process principles,"
the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court on the grounds that "re-
spondents' claims were ... based on due process principles," specifi-
cally the right of access to the courts as protected by the Due Process
Clause.3
16
Affirming the Sixth Circuit, Justice Stevens' 5-4 majority opinion
held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar ADA Title II suits
against states in federal court, at least as to claims implicating the
fundamental right of access to the courts. 317 The Court reserved judg-
ment with respect to the remaining portions of Title II.
The Supreme Court has held that Congress possesses broad power
306. Id.
307. Id. at 1983.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
314. Id. at 360.
315. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000).
316. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1983-84.
317. Id. at 1993.
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under the Fourteenth Amendment's enforcement clause (section 5) to
abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity.3 18 This congres-
sional power includes the ability "[to] enact so-called prophylactic leg-
islation that proscribes facially constitutional conduct, in order to
prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct. 31 Yet, while Congress'
section 5 power is broad, it is not without limits. 3 20 As the Court stated
in a two part test first set out in City of Boerne v. Flores: Section 5
legislation is valid only if it exhibits "a congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted
to that end."
321
In applying the Boerne test to the respondents' claims, Justice Ste-
vens first identified the constitutional rights Congress sought to enforce
when enacting Title 11.322 Included in these rights are "basic constitu-
tional guarantees" such as the right of access to the courts, as protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 23 Justice
Stevens then determined that Title II's enforcement measures are ap-
propriate relative to the harm Title II seeks to remedy.324 In addressing
this question, Justice Stevens concluded that "[t]he unequal treatment
of disabled persons in the administration ofjudicial services has a long
history and has persisted despite several legislative efforts to remedy
the problem. ,325 In view of this history, the Court concluded that
Title II's mandate to provide court access to disabled persons is a "rea-
sonable prophylactic measure, reasonably targeted to a legitimate
end. 3 26
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas,
Chief Justice Rehnquist found the Court's holding irreconcilable with
318. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (stating that Congress
possesses "broad power indeed" to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity through exer-
cise of its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Fitzpatrick v. Blitzer, 427 U.S.
445 (1976) (holding that Congress can abrogate a state's sovereign immunity to enforce
the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment).
319. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1985 (quoting Nev. Dep't. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S.
721, 727-28 (2003)).
320. Id. at 1986. In undertaking enforcement measures, Congress cannot affect sub-
stantive alterations of applicable law. Id. Thus, Courts must determine whether § 5 en-
forcement measures are remedial, and thus permissible, or impermissible because they
substantively redefine existing law. Id.
321. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
322. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1988.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 1988-89.
325. Id. at 1993. Consequently, the Court concluded that "Congress was justified in
concluding that this 'difficult and intractable proble[mi' warranted 'added prophylactic
measures in response."' Id.
326. Id. at 1994. Justice Stevens was careful to note that Congress requires states
to take only reasonable measures to comply with Title II. Id. at 1993. Cost and conve-
nience on their own, however, "cannot justify a State's failure to provide individuals with
a meaningful right of access to the courts." Id. at 1994.
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Garrett.3 27 In Chief Justice Rehnquist's view, Title II constituted an
invalid exercise of Congress' section 5 power because it failed to "exhibit
'congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end.'
328
The Lane decision is interesting for several reasons. While the fac-
tual context cried out for judicial relief, the Court clearly was reluctant
to retreat very far from its recent string of pro-states' rights decisions
in this area.129 The Court resolved this tension by making the narrow-
est of possible rulings. Rather than hold that Congress validly abro-
gated Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to Title II gener-
ally, the Court used a scalpel to extract and save only those suits
implementing the due process rights of access to the courts. 330 The prin-
cipal importance of Lane for labor and employment law purposes, how-
ever, is as a guide to future decisions affecting federal employment law
statutes. This topic is discussed in more detail below.
33
'
III. Assessing the Significance of the 2003-04 Term
The labor and employment decisions of the 2003-04 term likely
will not rank high in historical significance. That is not to say that these
decisions are not important or interesting; they are both. But this term
saw no blockbuster decisions similar to Ellerth and Faragher332 in 1998
or Sutton in 1999. 333 These decisions, even collectively, will have little
impact on the day-to-day work of most labor and employment law
practitioners.
Two of the cases had the potential to become blockbuster decisions,
but the Court decided each in a manner that avoided that outcome. If
the Court had affirmed the Sixth Circuit's decision in Cline and sanc-
tioned reverse discrimination claims under the ADEA, it would have
had the blockbuster effect of eliminating early retirement programs for
all practical purposes.3 34 Similarly, if the Court had affirmed the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Davila and sanctioned state law damages suits
against health plans for medical treatment coverage decisions, it may
have launched a medical malpractice revolution. 335 The Court, how-
ever, chose to do neither and instead endorsed the existing majority
interpretations running in the opposite direction on each issue. In
short, the final blockbuster tally for the term stands at status quo two,
blockbusters zero.
327. Id. at 1997 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
328. Id. at 1998 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520).
329. See infra notes 374-91 and accompanying text.
330. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1992-93.
331. See infra notes 374-91 and accompanying text.
332. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 742; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 775.
333. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 471.
334. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
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This general assessment of the 2003-04 term bolsters the status
of the two themes nominated above. If "the year of ERISA" label is
tweaked to read "the year of employee benefits," the first theme would
encompass Cline, which clearly is a case about benefits in a non-ERISA
setting. This broadened theme, then, would embrace a majority of the
Court's labor and employment decisions for the term (Cline and the
three ERISA cases), as well as the two most potentially significant de-
cisions of the term (Cline and Davila). The "not much happened" theme
also gains strength by the fact that the relatively small set of labor and
employment cases (seven) contains no decision of blockbuster quality.
With both quantity and quality coalescing in such modest order, it
seems safe to conclude that the Court experienced a relatively quiet
year on the labor and employment front.
The question remains whether these themes represent long-term
trends or merely blips on the radar screen. A look at some of the un-
derlying forces giving rise to these themes provides some insight on
this question.
A. Increase in Employee Benefit Decisions
The increased share of employee benefit decisions among the
Court's labor and employment docket has been building for some time.
Once again, the statistics compiled by former Section Secretary James
Brudney are instructive. 336 As he reported in 2000, cases arising under
ERISA and other retirement-related federal statutes rose from 11.69
percent of the Court's total of labor and employment decisions during
the period from 1987 to 1989 to 20.9 percent in the period spanning
1996 to 1999. 337 This increase primarily came at the expense of NLRA
and Title VII cases, which plummeted by more than one-half as a pro-
portion of the Court's labor and employment docket during that same
time period. 33' The trend has accelerated during the past three terms
as decisions arising under ERISA have equaled those arising under the
NLRA and Title VII combined.3 39
What is propelling this increase in ERISA decisions? This term's
employee benefits decisions provide several clues.
336. Brudney, supra note 1, at 153-59.
337. Id. at 156-57 n.12.
338. Id. at 155 nn.8 and 9 (reporting that labor-management decisions fell from
30.4 percent of the Court's labor and employment decisions in 1987-89 to just 13 percent
in 1996-99, and that race and sex discrimination cases fell from 26.1 percent (eighteen
out of a total of sixty-nine labor and employment decisions) of the Court's labor and
employment caseload in 1987-89 to 14.8 percent in the 1996-99 period; together ac-
counting for a drop from 56.5 percent to 27.8 percent).
339. During the past three terms, the Supreme Court has decided seven cases aris-
ing under ERISA, five cases arising under Title VII, and two cases interpreting the NLRA.
These data reflect the number of cases reported in the articles published by the two
immediately preceding Section secretaries, see Maria O'Brien Hylton, supra note 1, at
247 n.5, and Estlund, supra note 1, at'314-28, as well as in this article, see supra notes
5-8 and accompanying text.
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First, the Cline and Davila cases illustrate the front-burner nature
of health insurance benefits. Access to health care is a matter of crucial
importance, as has been demonstrated by the Clinton administration's
failed attempt at broad-based health care reform,3 4 ° by Congress' con-
tinued debate over a proposed patient's bill of rights,341 and by Senator
John Kerry's attempt to make health insurance a major campaign issue
during the 2004 presidential election.34 2 The Census Bureau in 2003
determined that 44 million Americans were without health insurance.
343
In the United States, most individuals who are able to obtain health
insurance do so through employer-sponsored plans.344 This fact alone
makes health insurance an important subject of labor and employment
law.
Second, the Cline and Heinz cases demonstrate that employers
are desperate to contain soaring benefit costs. Health care costs are
skyrocketing at double-digit rates, four times as fast as the rise in
wages.3 45 One estimate predicts that by 2006 the cost of employer-
sponsored health care coverage for the average American family will
hit $14,500.346 Benefit costs, however, are not limited to health care.
With a growing retiree population and an aging workforce, the cost
of funding employer pension obligations is staggering. 347 In total,
340. See generally HAYNES JOHNSON & DAVID S. BRODER, THE SYSTEM: THE AMER-
ICAN WAY OF POLITICS AT THE BREAKING POINT (1997) (discussing failure of Clinton ad-
ministration's attempts at health care reform); W. John Thomas, The Clinton Health Care
Reform Plan: A Failed Dramatic Presentation, 7 STAN L. & POL'Y REV. 83 (1996) (dis-
cussing the development and failure of Clinton's universal health care proposal); Dana
Priest, Democrats Pull the Plug on Health Care Reform, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1994, at
Al.
341. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 30, 108th Cong. (2003) (proposing a constitutional amend-
ment to provide that all citizens have the right to health care of "equal high quality");
Binette, supra note 210, at 689-93; Sharon Reece, The Circuitous Journey to the Patients'
Bill of Rights: Winners and Losers, 65 ALB. L. REV. 17, 31 (2001).
342. See Jeff Tieman, Dems Hang Hat on Healthcare; Coverage for Poor, Uninsured
in Spotlight at DNC, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Aug. 2, 2004, at 8; Ronald Brownstein, Kerry,
Edwards Offer Different Prescriptions: As Medical Costs Rise and Access to Insurance
Erodes, the Debate on Healthcare Moves to the Center of Candidates' Domestic Agendas,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2004, at A22.
343. See CATHERINE MCLAUGHLIN, HEALTH POLICY AND THE UNINSURED (2004); Da-
vid S. Broder, To Save U.S. Health Care System from Certain Disaster, Drastic Surgery
is Needed, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, July 15, 2004, at 12A.
344. See U.S. Census Bureau, Health Insurance Coverage in the United States:
2002, available at www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins.html (reporting that as of 2002,
61.3 percent of Americans were covered by employment-based health insurance, while
only 9.2 percent of the population obtained coverage through direct purchase of a private
health plan).
345. Broder, supra note 343, at 12A. See also Eduardo Porter, Rising Cost of Health
Benefits Cited as Factor in Slump of Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2004, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2004/08/19/business/19care.html.
346. See Broder, supra note 343, at 12A.
347. See Kathy M. Kristof, Big Firms' Pension Deficits Continue, L.A. TIMES, June
18, 2004, at Cl (stating that the 1,000 largest U.S. companies reported a combined short-
fall in pension funding of $278.6 billion in 2003); Pension Bills Coming Due, But Will We
Be Able to Pay? CRAIN'S CHI. BUS., Mar. 15, 2004, at 10.
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employer-paid benefits constitute more than 15 percent of total em-
ployee compensation.34 8
Finally, the Davila decision highlights the ongoing federal/state
tug of war with respect to the regulation of employee benefits. Much
of this debate flows from the manner in which ERISA is structured.
ERISA establishes procedural requirements with respect to the report-
ing, disclosure, and fiduciary responsibilities of covered benefit plans.34 9
However, while ERISA contains detailed provisions governing the fund-
ing and content of pension plans, it contains little in the way of sub-
stantive regulation with respect to the content of welfare benefit plans,
such as those providing health benefits. 35 0 This regulatory vacuum
serves as a powerful incentive for states to adopt their own regulatory
schemes such as the Texas statute at issue in Davila. 351 But such efforts
frequently run head long into ERISA's broad preemptive exclusion of
state regulation.35 2 The result is a game of cat and mouse that has
produced a steady stream of ERISA preemption cases and a bewilder-
ing maze of preemption jurisprudence. 353
The increased importance of ERISA issues on the Supreme Court's
agenda also is explained in part by the declining presence of labor and
Title VII cases. As noted above, the increase in employee benefit deci-
sions and the decrease in NLRA and Title VII decisions essentially have
occurred in tandem.
354
Several factors likely have influenced this trend. First, the ongoing
decline in union density produces fewer labor disputes and may dimin-
ish the perceived importance of labor issues in the eyes of the Court.3 5
Second, both the NLRA and Title VII are mature statutes that are
largely uncomplicated by recent amendments. These "ossified" statu-
tory schemes, accordingly, may require less in the way of judicial con-
348. LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2002/2003 120,
tbl. 2.2 (2003).
349. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (2000).
350. See Peter J. Wiedenbeck, ERISA's Curious Coverage, 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 311,
341 (1998).
351. See Lorraine Schmall & Brenda Stephens, ERISA Preemption:A Move Towards
Defederalizing Claims for Patients' Rights, 42 BRANDEIS L. J. 529, 530 n.4 (2004) (re-
porting that ten states, including Texas, have passed managed care liability statutes).
352. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000) ("[T]he provisions of [ERISA] shall supersede any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan.").
353. See generally Befort & Kopka, supra note 217.
354. See supra notes 337-40 and accompanying text.
355. Union membership peaked in the United States in 1954 at 34.7 percent of the
nonagricultural labor force, and then began a long and steady decline. See MICHAEL
GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 11, tbl. 2 (1987).
Bureau of Labor Statistics data for 2003 show that union membership has fallen to 12.9
percent of the nonagricultural labor force. See U.S. Department of Labor, Union Members
Summary (Jan. 21, 2004), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
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struction.3 56 Finally, to the extent that the current Court is considered
to be conservative in its interpretation of labor and civil rights laws,
union and employee representatives may consciously be choosing not
to present some key issues for review.
357
Neither the factors facilitating the increase in employee benefit
cases nor those posited for the declining prevalence of labor and Title
VII cases are short term in nature. This suggests that the Court's re-
shuffling of its docket is likely to continue into the foreseeable future.
This conclusion also makes something of a sage out of Keith Hylton,
the former secretary of the Section of Labor and Employment Law, who
wrote the following in his 1999 article:
... the day may soon come in which ERISA cases make up by far the
largest share of the Court's labor and employment decisions. Tradi-
tional labor and employment law teachers will not, for the most part,
be attracted to the prospect of reviewing these decisions.
358
As a teacher of traditional labor and employment law courses, I think
that Professor Hylton was prescient in more ways than one.
B. The Overall Decrease in Labor and Employment Decisions
This term's overall decline in labor and employment decisions also
reflects a growing tendency. As noted above, labor and employment
decisions generally comprised around 16 percent of the Court's total
docket during the twenty-five years preceding 2000. 359 In four of the
last five terms, however, the Court's share of labor and employment
decisions has fallen below that norm.
360
This trend likely will continue for the near future as it reflects what
appears to be the Court's conscious policy of diverting employment
claims away from the federal court system. A steady deluge of federal
employment claims built during the early 1990s following the enact-
ment of the ADA and the FMLA. In the four years following 1991, for
example, the number of employment claims in federal court jumped by
128 percent.36 1 By 1997, cases involving the workplace constituted an
estimated 10 percent of the entire federal court docket.36 2 During this
same time frame, the Supreme Court began to issue a series of decisions
356. See Gottesman, supra note 1, at 327; see also Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossifi-
cation of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527 (2002).
357. Keith Hylton, supra note 1, at 266.
358. Id. at 267.
359. See note 12 and accompanying text.
360. The 2001-02 term is the outlier of this group. See Estlund, supra note 1, at 291
(reporting that labor and employment cases made up 22 percent of that year's total case-
load).
361. See Stuart H. Bompey et al., The Attack on Arbitration and Mediation of Em-
ployment Disputes, 13 LAB. LAw. 21, 22 (1997).
362. Id.
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redirecting many of these claims elsewhere. The Court's three-prong
strategy is described below.
1. Encouraging Arbitration
In 1991, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Gilmer
v. Interstate /Johnson Lane Corp., holding that an employment discrim-
ination plaintiff may waive his right to proceed in court by entering
into a predispute agreement to submit such claims to arbitration. 363
The Court explained that while a plaintiff cannot prospectively waive
the right to file a statutory discrimination claim, she can agree to forgo
pursuing such a claim in a judicial forum. 36 4 The Court in Gilmer ef-
fectively reversed decades of judicial hostility to arbitration and ruled
that arbitration agreements are valid under the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) unless the statute in question expressly evinces a policy pro-
scribing such a waiver.365 Significantly, the Court also ruled that such
agreements are enforceable even where the agreement reflects an in-
equality in bargaining power.
366
The Gilmer Court, however, did not decide the reach of the FAA's
exclusion for "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees,
or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce."367 The lower courts divided on whether this language excluded
all employees working for a business engaged in interstate commerce 368
or just those engaged in the actual transportation of goods.3 69 The Su-
preme Court in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams resolved this issue
by adopting the latter construction, thereby extending the FAA's pref-
erence for arbitration to the vast majority of American employees. 370
Following Gilmer and Circuit City, most arbitration agreements
are enforceable unless they are procedurally defective or limit the sub-
stantive rights or remedies available to the parties.37 1 Even here, the
Court, in a trio of nonemployment cases decided in the 2002-03 term,
ruled that questions concerning the validity of procedures and remedies
under an arbitration agreement should be decided initially by the ar-
363. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
364. Id. at 33-35.
365. Id. at 26.
366. Id. at 33.
367. 9 U.S.C. § 1. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25-26 n.2 (stating that the Court need
not construe the FAA exception because the arbitration clause at issue was contained in
a securities exchange contract, not an employment contract).
368. See generally Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1998).
369. See, e.g., Matthews v. Rollins Hudig Hall Co., 72 F.3d 50, 53 (7th Cir. 1995);
Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 599-601 (6th Cir. 1995).
370. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
371. See, e.g., Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 936-37 (4th Cir.
1999) (finding arbitration agreement unenforceable where procedural rules are egre-
giously unfair); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Tech. Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1057-58 (11th Cir.
1998) (finding arbitration agreement unenforceable where the agreement does not au-
thorize the arbitrator to award relief authorized by statute).
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bitrator rather than by the court in most instances.3 72 Lower courts
have extended these rulings to the employment setting.
373
In this line of cases, the Court opened the door for the parties to
substitute private arbitration for federal court litigation. In doing so,
however, significant questions remain concerning the appropriate pro-
cedures and remedies of the arbitral alternative. While it is still too
early to tell how many parties will adopt this substitute forum, it is
clear that an increasing number of employment claims are now barred
from the federal courthouse on this ground.
2. The Eleventh Amendment and State Defendants
The second diversionary tool utilized by the Supreme Court is the
Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.374 Pursuant to the
Court's jurisprudence, a state is not subject to suit in federal court
unless it has given its consent to be sued or Congress has explicitly and
validly abrogated such immunity.37' The Court has invoked the Elev-
enth Amendment in a series of decisions that immunize states from
suits under a number of federal employment statutes.
In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,376 the Supreme Court set
out a two-part test to determine whether a federal statute abrogates
Eleventh Amendment immunity, by inquiring (1) "whether Congress
has 'unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate the immunity"'
and (2) whether it has acted "pursuant to a valid exercise of power."377
The second of these factors requires that Congress, in enacting legis-
lation, act in furtherance of section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.378
The Court has admonished that, for a resulting statute to be valid,
"there must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to
be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end."
379
372. See generally Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003); PacifiCare
Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003); Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
537 U.S. 79 (2002).
373. See, e.g., Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 346 F.3d 821, 823-24 (8th Cir.
2003).
374. The Eleventh Amendment provides: "[t]he Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. Amend. XI. Although the amendment refers only to
suits against a state by citizens of another state, the Court has long extended the amend-
ment's application to suits by citizens against their own states. Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1 (1890).
375. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,662-63 (1974) (discussing consent);Atas-
cadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239-41 (1985) (discussing abrogation).
376. Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
377. Id., 517 U.S. at 55.
378. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. Section 5 grants Congress the authority to
enforce the substantive guarantees of §1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits
the states from making any law that deprives individuals of due process or equal protec-
tion. U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
379. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
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The Court, so far, has applied this test to hold that Congress did
not validly abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under three fed-
eral employment statutes: the Fair Labor Standards Act,38 ° ADEA,38 1
and Title I of the ADA.38 2 As a result, state employees cannot sue the
state in federal court under these statutes. In contrast, the Court has
ruled that Congress did validly abrogate Eleventh Amendment im-
munity with respect to the family-care provision of the FMLA38 3 and,
in a nonemployment case, with respect to access to the courts under
Title II of the ADA.38 4
The difference in these results can be explained, at least in part,
by the different level of scrutiny afforded to the classifications at issue.
As the Court explained in Nevada Department of Human Resources v.
Hibbs, the statutes in the former group of cases concerned classifica-
tions, such as age and disability, that are subject only to rational basis
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.38 5 In this context, the
Court is prone to conclude that the substantive requirements imposed
by the statute are disproportionate to any unconstitutional conduct
that conceivably could be targeted by that act.38 6 In sharp contrast, the
Court found in Hibbs that the FMLA's leave entitlement for family care
purposes was intended by Congress to redress a past pattern of gender
discrimination, a classification entitled to a higher level of scrutiny.
38 7
Because of this higher standard, the Court found that "it was easier for
Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations" sufficient
to sustain the abrogation of immunity.38 8 The Court similarly upheld
Congress' abrogation of immunity under Title II of the ADA, noting
that the right of access to the courts implicates fundamental due pro-
cess rights entitled to heightened Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny.
38 9
If the level-of-scrutiny factor continues to be determinative, it is
likely that the Court will find a valid abrogation in Title VII's race and
gender discrimination ban because both of these classifications receive
heightened scrutiny.39 0 On the other hand, the Court likely will view
the FMLA's leave entitlement for an employee's own serious health
condition as akin to ADA Title I claims and thus not validly abrogated.
380. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
381. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
382. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 356.
383. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 726-27.
384. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978. This decision is discussed supra at notes 303-31 and
accompanying text.
385. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735 (contrasting Hibbs with Kimel (age) and Garrett
(disability) as to their respective levels of scrutiny).
386. See, e.g., Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82.
387. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728.
388. Id. at 736.
389. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1992-93.
390. See STEPHEN F. BEFORT, 17 MINN. PRAC., EMPLOYMENT LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 12.12 (2d ed. 2003).
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The ultimate effect of these Eleventh Amendment decisions is to
preclude approximately 5 million state employees from suing their em-
ployer in federal court under three or perhaps four federal employment
statutes.391 Here again, the Court has succeeded in diminishing the
federal employment litigation caseload.
3. Restricting Disability Status
One of the principal reasons for the surge in federal court employ-
ment cases during the 1990s was Congress' adoption of the ADA in
1990. This loosely crafted statute with an antidiscrimination formula
unlike that of Title VII cried out for judicial interpretation.39 2 Between
the ADA's effective date in 1992 and the end of fiscal year 2003, claim-
ants filed more than 189,000 charges of disability discrimination with
the EEOC.3 93 In a relatively short span from 1998 to 2004, the Supreme
Court decided sixteen cases construing the ADA.3 94 In this light, it is
not surprising that the Court's third device for reducing employment-
related federal court litigation is to raise the bar for plaintiffs seeking
to assert claims under the ADA.
Under the ADA's statutory formula, a plaintiff may assert a claim
of discrimination only if he or she is an "individual with a disability.
'
"
3 95
The ADA defines a covered "disability" as "a physical or mental im-
pairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activ-
ities of such individual."39 6 Alternatively, an individual may qualify as
disabled for purposes of the ADA if he or she has a "record" of such an
impairment or is "regarded as" having such an impairment.3 9 7
In four decisions beginning in 1999, the Court has narrowed the
class of protected "disabled" employees under the ADA. The first and
391. U.S. Census statistics for March 2002 list total state employment at 5,072,130.
U.S. Census, State Government Employment Data: March 2002 United States Totals,
available at http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/apes/02stus.txt (last visited July 20, 2004).
392. See Befort & Thomas, supra note 55, at 80-81 (describing ten contentious ADA
issues on which the circuit courts and/or the EEOC took conflicting positions and also
discussing the reasons for this widespread judicial dissonance).
393. See The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) Charges, FY 1992-FY 2003 (reporting that 189,621
charges were filed under the ADA from the act's effective date in 1992 through September
30, 2003), at www.eeoc.gov/stats/ADA (last modified Mar. 8, 2004).
394. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978; Hernandez, 124 S. Ct. at 513; Clackamas Gastroenter-
ology Assoc. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003); Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002); Chevron
USA, Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 72 (2002); U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391
(2002); EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v.
Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002); PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001); Garrett,
531 U.S. at 356; Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United
Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 471; Cleveland v. Policy
Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998); Pa. Dep't
of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998).
395. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
396. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000).
397. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B), (C) (2000).
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most significant of these decisions was the landmark case of Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc.
398
Karen Sutton and Kimberly Hinton were twin sisters who both
suffered from severe myopia. Each had uncorrected visual acuity of 20/
200 in one eye and 20/400 in the other, but with corrective lenses their
vision improved to 20/20 or better.39 9 In 1992, both sisters applied for
employment with United Air Lines (United) as commercial airline pi-
lots. United rejected both sisters because they did not meet minimum
uncorrected vision requirements. a° Petitioners brought suit under the
ADA, alleging that they fit within the protected class of individuals
with a disability due to their respective vision impairments or, alter-
natively, because they were "regarded as" having a substantially lim-
iting impairment.
The key issue in determining the twins' prong-one disability claim
concerned whether mitigating measures should be considered in deter-
mining whether a person is "substantially limited" in a major life ac-
tivity. The EEOC had issued interpretive guidelines suggesting that
the issue of disability status should be assessed without regard to mit-
igating measures.4° 1 Under this approach, for example, an individual
with diabetes who could perform normally with insulin injections, but
who without insulin would lapse into a coma, would be considered "dis-
abled" and thus protected by the ADA.4 °2 The Sutton Court, in a 7-2
decision, disagreed, stating:
[I]t is apparent that if a person is taking measures to correct for, or
mitigate, a physical or mental impairment, the effects of those mea-
sures-both positive and negative-must be taken into account when
judging whether that person is "substantially limited" in a major life
activity and thus "disabled" under the Act. 403
The Court rejected the contrary recommendations of the agency
guidelines as "an impermissible interpretation of the ADA."40 4 The
Court reasoned that a person whose impairment is corrected by miti-
gating measures does not have an impairment that presently substan-
tially limits a major life activity and therefore should not be considered
disabled under the ADA.40 5 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
placed great weight on congressional findings set out in the ADA's pre-
amble to the effect that the Act would protect some 43,000,000 Amer-
398. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
399. Id. at 475.
400. Id. at 475-76.
401. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (1998).
402. See, e.g., Arnold v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 136 F.3d 854 (1st Cir. 1998) (follow-
ing the EEOC's guidance).
403. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 482-83.
Labor and Employment Law Decisions of the Supreme Court 221
icans.4 °6 The Court explained that this figure would be much higher if
the statute covered all persons with corrected conditions.4 °7
The Supreme Court also rejected the sisters' alternative contention
that they were protected under the ADA because they were "regarded
as" disabled. The Sutton majority explained that an individual may fall
within this "third prong" of the statutory "disability" definition in either
of two ways: "(1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has
a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual,
non-limiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life
activities."40 8 In either situation, the Court explained, the impairment,
as perceived, must be one that substantially limits one or more major
life activities. 40 9 Applying this standard to the Sutton facts, the Court
ruled that the mere allegation that an employer has a vision require-
ment does not establish that the employer regarded the petitioners as
substantially limited in the major life activity of working. 410 At best,
the Court stated, the employer only regarded them as unable to perform
the single job of a global airline pilot.411
The Court issued two companion decisions on the same day as Sut-
ton that reached similar results. In Murphy v. United Parcel Service,
Inc., the Court held that a mechanic with hypertension and high blood
pressure was not disabled when evaluated after considering the miti-
gating effect of his medication.41 2 The Court also ruled that Murphy
was not regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of
working because he was only viewed as unfit for jobs that required a
commercial driver's license. In the other case, Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirk-
ingburg, the Court held that whether monocular vision is a covered
disability must be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into ac-
406. Id. at 484-86 (discussing congressional findings set out in 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(a)(1)).
407. Id. at 486 (stating that 'the 43 million figure reflects an understanding that
those whose impairments are largely corrected by medication or other devices are not
'disabled' within the meaning of the ADA"). The Court also stressed the importance of
making an individualized inquiry with respect to each person making an ADA claim. The
Court opined that the EEOC's guidance instruction to assess claimants in an uncorrected
state impermissibly would create a system in which persons would be treated as members
of a group rather than as individuals. Id. at 483-84.
408. Id. at 489.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 489-94. EEOC regulations state that an individual is substantially lim-
ited in the major life activity of working only if he or she is "significantly restricted in
the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as
compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities." 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
411. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 493.
412. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
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count mitigating measures including the brain's ability to compensate
for the loss of vision in one eye.4 13
The Court further restricted the "disability" standing requirement
three years later in Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, where
it overturned a Sixth Circuit decision that had found an assembly-line
worker with carpal tunnel syndrome and tendonitis to be substantially
limited in performing manual tasks because of her workplace difficul-
ties in gripping tools and in performing repetitive work with hands and
arms extended at or above shoulder level.41 4 The Supreme Court ex-
plained that the proper inquiry was to determine whether an individual
has an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual
from engaging in activities that are of central importance to daily
life.4 15 This inquiry should involve an individualized assessment of the
effect of the impairment.4 16 In this case, the Court determined that the
Sixth Circuit had engaged in an overly narrow inquiry by considering
only those tasks that Williams performed at work, while ignoring the
impairment's impact on her nonwork activities.41 7 Since a broader view
revealed that Williams could still perform household chores and per-
sonal hygiene activities, the Court concluded that she was not substan-
tially limited in performing manual tasks and hence not disabled for
purposes of the ADA.4" 8
These decisions have significantly restricted the ADA's standing
requirement for individuals with a qualifying "disability." One measure
of this effect is provided by the EEOC's charge-filing statistics, which
show a drop in annual ADA charges from the 17,000-18,000 range
during fiscal years 1996-1999 to a range of 15,000-16,000 charges filed
in each of the four fiscal years following the Sutton decision.419 At an-
other level, Professor Ruth Colker has conducted a detailed analysis of
decided ADA federal court decisions and reported that the courts have
resolved approximately 93 percent of these cases in favor of employ-
ers.420 Many of these decisions are the result of summary judgment
413. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
414. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
415. Id. at 198.
416. Id. at 198-99.
417. Id. at 200-01.
418. Id. at 202.
419. See The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990 (ADA) Charges, FY 1992-FY 2003 (reporting ADA charges filed with
the EEOC from the act's effective date in 1992 through September 30, 2003), at www.
eeoc.gov/stats/ada-charges.html (last modified Mar. 8, 2004).
420. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants,
34 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 109 (1999) (finding, based on empirical analysis of decided
court decisions, that defendants prevailed in 92.7 percent of all ADA cases at the trial
court level and 94 percent of all ADA cases at the appellate level). See also Diller, supra
note 56, at 22 (suggesting that the federal courts currently are engaged in "some kind of
judicial backlash against the ADA").
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rulings based upon a determination that the plaintiff lacks "disability"
status.421
4. Making Sense of the Decline
Taken together, the Supreme Court's three-prong attack seems de-
signed to reduce the workplace-related caseload of the federal court
system. It also likely means that the current downturn in the number
of labor and employment cases decided by the Supreme Court is not a
fleeting phenomenon. Here again, the insights of a former Section Sec-
retary rise to that of "sage" quality. In her 2002 article in this journal,
Secretary Estlund summarized a surprisingly high eighteen decisions
(the only term of the decade to exceed ten labor and employment de-
cisions) but predicted that this upsurge was unlikely to continue, stat-
ing: ". . . Whatever may account for this uptick, it seems unlikely to
signal a long-term trend, for the thrust of many of the decisions was to
raise the substantive bar for plaintiffs-especially anti-discrimination
plaintiffs and most especially plaintiffs under the ADA-in future
lawsuits. ,4
22
Does this decline in federal and Supreme Court employment cases
presage a shrinking of the labor and employment law field generally?
That is not a forgone conclusion by any means. The Supreme Court's
three-prong strategy does not so much eliminate employment law
claims as it does transfer them to other forums. The Gilmer line of
decisions, for example, simply shifts some employment cases from fed-
eral court to an arbitral forum.4 23 The Eleventh Amendment42 4 and
"disability"425 decisions largely reroute claims from federal courts to
state courts. Thus, labor and employment lawyers, many of whom be-
long to the fifth largest of all ABA sections, will continue to be busy,
albeit sometimes at a different location.4 26
This change in forum is not all bad. A system of litigating employ-
ment disputes in courts of general jurisdiction is expensive, slow, and
421. See Colker, supra note 420, at 109; Befort & Thomas, supra note 55, at 80.
422. Estlund, supra note 1, at 291.
423. See supra notes 363-73 and accompanying text.
424. While the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state defendants in federal
courts under several federal employment statutes, see supra notes 374-91 and accom-
panying text, the Eleventh Amendment does not preclude the assertion of federal or state
law claims in state courts. See, e.g., Williamson v. Dep't of Human Res., 572 S.E.2d 678
(Ga. App. 2002).
425. See Ruth Colker & Adam Milani, The Post-Garrett World: Insufficient State
Protection Against Disability Discrimination, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1075, 1081 (2002) (noting
that all fifty states have state laws banning disability discrimination in employment but
that many state statutes do not provide the same level of protection as does the ADA).
426. More than 22,000 individuals belong to the Labor and Employment Law Section
of the American Bar Association. See American Bar Association, Labor and Employment
Law, Membership, available at www.abanet.org/labor/home.html (last visited Aug. 30,
2004).
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cumbersome.4 27 In contrast to the typical two and one-half year time-
table for litigated employment termination'cases to reach trial, for ex-
ample, labor arbitration cases generally are completed in less than one
year's time.42' A system of specialized labor courts, as used in most
European and South American countries, 429 could reduce the maze of
multiple claims in multiple forums that currently plagues American
employment law.4 30 But a move in that direction should be accom-
plished, if at all, through legislation that establishes fair and predict-
able procedures as well as a uniform body of substantive law. The
Court's ad hoc redirection of some employment law claims does neither.
IV. Conclusion
The decisions of the 2003-04 term provide a snapshot of two on-
going trends in the labor and employment law field. The first concerns
the growing importance of employee benefit matters relative to other
labor and employment topics. As the baby boomer cohort ages, issues
relating to health care and retirement income loom ever larger. In ad-
dition, ERISA's regulatory vacuum with respect to the substance of
welfare benefit plans generates a steady stream of federal preemption
disputes. Congressional inertia, not only specifically with respect to
health care reform but also more generally with respect to labor and
employment law reform, likely will ensure that issues relating to em-
ployee benefits will continue to gain on the more traditional practice
areas under the NLRA and Title VII in relative significance.
The second trend illustrated by this term's set of decisions is the
Supreme Court's continued efforts to redirect employment law claims
away from the federal court system. By virtue of its interpretation of
arbitration agreements, the Eleventh Amendment, and the ADA, the
Court has diverted a growing number of employment disputes to ar-
bitral and state court forums. As a result of these efforts, and barring
the enactment of congressional reforms, the Court's labor and employ-
ment law agenda likely will remain lean for the foreseeable future.
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